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Abstract
Standardized behavioural assessments of awareness remain the gold standard for patients
with disorders of consciousness (DOC) and inform diagnosis, prognosis, and medical
decision-making. However, recent neuroimaging research has identified a small but
significant number of DOC patients who retain perceptual and cognitive abilities not
evidenced by their behaviour. Therefore, it is imperative to develop assessment
techniques to identify and characterize the conscious experiences of patients with DOC.
This thesis presents a novel movie-based electroencephalographic (EEG) assessment of
perceptual and cognitive function in DOC patients. In Chapter 2, we calculated EEG
inter-subject correlations (ISCs) in healthy controls and DOC patients to index higherorder “executive” processing of two types of movie stimuli (audio-visual, audio-only).
Contrary to their behavioural diagnosis, 25% and 30% of patients showed preserved
perceptual and cognitive abilities necessary to process the audio-visual and auditory
movies, respectively. In Chapter 3, we determined whether a translated version of the
auditory movie could be used to assess French-speaking populations of DOC patients.
Here, two groups of healthy controls (English and French-speaking) showed comparable
degrees of ISCs that occurred at roughly the same timepoints across languages. In
Chapter 4, we explored the prognostic utility of ISCs, functional connectivity, and source
localized EEG activity in a cohort of patients with severe acute brain injury. ISCs and
functional connectivity, but not source localized activity, were marginally predictive of
outcomes after severe brain injury. Over three studies, we developed and validated a
novel EEG assessment of perceptual and cognitive function in DOC patients,
demonstrated its potential application in English and French populations, and established
the feasibility of this assessment in acutely brain-injured patients.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Disorders of consciousness (DOC) are a class of neurological disorders that can result
from severe brain injury. Patients with DOC exhibit minimal behavioural evidence that
they are aware of themselves or their environment; they may appear to be awake but fail
to respond to stimulation or verbal command. However, DOC are diagnosed solely on the
basis of observable behaviour, which may be impaired in patients with severe brain
injury. Recent neuroimaging research has identified a small but significant number of
DOC patients who show neural evidence of conscious awareness, despite remaining
behaviourally non-responsive. One method to uncover the neural correlates of awareness
in DOC patients is to use movie stimuli and track patients’ neural responses to elements
of the story like its suspense, which cannot be processed unconsciously. This thesis
presents a novel movie-based electroencephalographic (EEG) assessment of residual
awareness in patients with DOC. In Chapter 2, we calculated EEG inter-subject
correlations (ISCs) between healthy controls and patients with DOC to compare the
similarity of their neural responses during two movie types (audio-visual, audio only).
Overall, 25% and 30% of patients produced neural activity that closely resembled healthy
controls—suggesting a comparable degree of narrative processing—during the audiovisual and audio movie, respectively. In Chapter 3, we compared EEG activity across
English and French-speaking healthy controls to determine whether a translated (to
French) version of the auditory movie assessment was suitable for French-speaking DOC
patients. Here, both groups produced comparable degrees of ISCs that occurred at
roughly the same time points, thereby validating this assessment for French-speaking
populations of DOC patients. In Chapter 4, we explored whether the auditory movie
could help predict recovery from recent serious brain injury. We found that ISCs and
EEG functional connectivity were marginally associated with survival. Over three
studies, we developed and validated a novel EEG assessment of awareness in DOC
patients, demonstrated its potential application in English and French populations, and
established the feasibility of this assessment in recently brain-injured patients.
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Chapter 1
1

General Introduction

1.1 The (behavioural) problem of consciousness
Understanding the physiological basis of conscious awareness is one of the most
profound problems facing modern neuroscience. Recent years have seen significant
progress in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness and its supporting systems.
However, fundamental questions concerning its properties, functions, as well as its
necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g., after serious injury, in artificial systems)
remain. While there are many competing definitions of conscious awareness (Del Pin et
al., 2021; Zhao et al., 2019), in general, this refers to the existence of a rich internal
experience in which a subject is aware of themselves and their environment (Frewen et
al., 2020; Northoff & Lamme, 2020; Sattin et al., 2021). We know, intimately, what this
awareness entails—what it feels like, for instance, to enjoy a hot cup of coffee or when
we are fully immersed in an engaging movie—and we know what it is like when
awareness is diminished, like during dreamless sleep (Bayne et al., 2016; Hobson &
Pace-Schott, 2002; Windt et al., 2016; Zeman, 2001). However, given that consciousness
is a subjective phenomenon, how can we objectively determine whether others have a
comparable conscious experience? While this is an incredibly complex question, the
answer in most contexts is relatively straightforward: we cannot know with absolute
certainty that someone is conscious, but we can infer it on the basis of observable
behaviour and verbal reports. In fact, our brains are primed to do precisely this.
Humans are uniquely social creatures; we engage in highly complex and dynamic social
systems which require sophisticated coordination among multiple cortical networks to
navigate effectively (Dunbar, 2009; Dunbar, 1998; Graziano & Kastner, 2011; Rosa
Salva et al., 2015). One feature of this so-called “social brain” is the ability to detect
other minds—to ascribe agency, awareness, and intentionality—in individuals who
produce voluntary and goal-directed behaviour (Arico et al., 2011; Björnsssson &
Shepherd, 2020). This occurs automatically when interacting with other people but also
extends to certain species of non-human animals and to (seemingly) intelligent machines,
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though to a much lesser extent (Arico et al., 2011; Nielsen et al., 2022; Urquiza-Haas &
Kotrschal, 2015; van der Woerdt & Haselager, 2019). This ability, often referred to as
mind-reading (or theory of mind), is extremely useful for navigating social situations; it
helps reliably predict the future behaviour of others and supports interpersonal
interactions (Adolphs, 2009; Brown & Brüne, 2012; Molapour et al., 2021; Thornton et
al., 2019).
Outside of purely social contexts, observable behaviour and verbal reports remain the
primary mechanisms through which we understand the mental states of others. Even in
clinical settings, behavioural assessments of conscious awareness are the gold standard.
For example, we can determine that a patient has woken up after major surgery once they
begin to exhibit voluntary movements or respond to verbal commands (e.g., “raise your
left hand”). While there are other informative physiological markers (Bodien et al., 2016;
Martens et al., 2020; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974), behaviour is a ubiquitous and highly
reliable indicator of conscious awareness (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Martens et al., 2020;
Schnakers et al., 2009; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976). Nevertheless, there are several
situations in which behaviour alone is insufficient to establish awareness or characterize
conscious experience. Additionally, in many of these situations, accurate assessments of
awareness are of critical importance.
It is generally accepted that conscious awareness is not synonymous with behaviour (but
see Kotchoubey, 2018; Leslie, 2015); there are many instances in which the two become
dissociated. Sleepwalkers, for example, appear to be awake but often do not exhibit any
signs of awareness, nor do they report post hoc memories of the event, despite sometimes
engaging in highly complex behaviour (Arnulf, 2018; Pressman, 2013). Absence (petit
mal) seizures, too, can temporarily disrupt awareness without affecting arousal
(wakefulness; Blumenfeld, 2012; 2005). Conversely, there are situations in which
awareness is decoupled from behaviour. Dreaming is a clear example, where individuals
experience a wide range of perceptual phenomena without corresponding overt behaviour
(Hobson, 2009; Siclari et al., 2013; Tart, 2001). A more concerning example are cases of
intraoperative awareness (IOA). IOA is a rare occurrence in which patients regain
consciousness during an invasive medical procedure. Though temporary, IOA is highly
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distressing and can cause lasting psychological harm to patients (Graham, Owen, Ipi, et
al., 2018; Graham, Owen, Weijer, et al., 2018). However, IOA is extremely difficult to
identify; patients who experience IOA cannot move and are thus unable to communicate
their awareness through behaviour (Mashour et al., 2011). Techniques are being
developed to detect IOA in real-time, but the mechanisms underlying this state are not
well understood. As such, there are no valid and reliable tools to replace behavioural
measures of awareness (Castellon-Larios et al., 2016; Graham, Owen, Ipi, et al., 2018;
Huang et al., 2018; Loskota, 2005; Mashour et al., 2009, 2011).
Although phenomena like IOA have significant clinical implications, there are other
circumstances in which awareness, or lack thereof, is used to guide the course of medical
treatment (Hohwy & Reutens, 2009; Kahane & Savulescu, 2009). Indeed, apparent
failure to recover conscious awareness after severe brain injury—whether in the initial
acute stages or in the long term—can inform decisions about whether to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining therapy (Holland et al., 2014; Verheijde et al., 2009). Indeed,
low likelihood of recovery or the prospect of severe, lasting impairments in cognitive
functions, including those that support conscious awareness may lead substitute decisionmakers to request a transition to end-of-life care (Lotto et al., 2012). While challenging,
the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment in such cases is generally supported by
physicians and members of the public, as chronic impairments in consciousness are
commonly viewed as a worst-case outcome (Demertzi et al., 2011; Demertzi et al., 2014;
Gipson et al., 2014; Graham, 2017; Payne et al., 1996). Severe brain injury, however, can
differentially affect multiple areas of the brain (Cruse, Chennu, Chatelle, et al., 2012;
Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2015). For example, patients may experience severe motor
dysfunction but retain (or recover) some degree of awareness after their injury. In such
instances, patients may be partially or fully conscious but unable to express their
awareness during standardized behavioural assessments (Edlow et al., 2017; Laureys et
al., 2005; Lutkenhoff et al., 2015; Martens et al., 2020; Osborne et al., 2015). In fact, this
is precisely the situation for a small but significant number of patients diagnosed with a
disorder of consciousness (DOC; Kondziella et al., 2016; Owen, 2008).
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1.2 Disorders of consciousness
DOC are a class of rare neurological disorders broadly characterized by impairments in
conscious awareness (Bernat, 2006; Laureys, 2007; Owen, 2008; Zeman, 2001).
Common causes of DOC include traumatic brain injury (TBI), stroke, cardiac arrest, and
cerebral hemorrhage (Cruse, Chennu, Chatelle, et al., 2012; Edlow et al., 2021). DOC
encompass multiple diagnostic categories describing different degrees of dysfunction
across two domains: wakefulness and awareness (Laureys, 2005; Laureys et al., 2009;
Owen et al., 2006). These categories include coma, the vegetative state, and the
minimally conscious state (Fins et al., 2007; Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Kondziella et al.,
2016; Tart, 2001). Coma is arguably the most severe form of DOC and occurs during the
acute stages of severe brain injury. Patients in a coma remain entirely behaviourally nonresponsive during assessments like the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett,
1974) and do not exhibit any signs of wakefulness (i.e., eyes closed) or awareness. Coma
will typically resolve within 2 – 4 weeks post-injury, but outcome trajectories from this
state are highly variable (Laureys et al., 2001; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976; Wijdicks, 2012).
Some patients will emerge from a coma and make a good recovery, while others may be
diagnosed with brain death: an irreversible cessation of all brain function (Gosseries et
al., 2011; Laureys et al., 2009). However, between these two outcomes are more complex
diagnoses like the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state (Giacino et al.,
2014; Owen, 2008).
After emerging from a coma, a small number of patients will transition into what is
classically known as a vegetative state (now often referred to as Unresponsive
Wakefulness Syndrome; UWS). The vegetative state is defined as a state of wakefulness
without awareness (Laureys, 2007; Owen, 2008; von Wild et al., 2012). Patients in a
vegetative state demonstrate eye-opening and closing behaviour indicative of sleep-wake
cycles but do not appear to be aware of themselves or their environment (Cologan et al.,
2013; Gibson et al., 2020). These patients may gaze at their surroundings and produce
spontaneous motor movements or vocalizations but fail to respond during standardized
behavioural measures of awareness like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R
Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). Patients may remain in a vegetative state for months or years
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al., 2018; Holland et al., 2014; von Wild et al., 2012). However, a substantial minority of
patients may begin to produce inconsistent but reliable behavioural indicators of
awareness over time and, thereby, meet the criteria for a diagnosis of minimally
conscious (Burke, 2002; Fins et al., 2007; Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Owen, 2008). The
minimally conscious state encompasses a wide range of behavioural responsiveness, from
the ability to localize pain or engage in visual pursuit (MCS minus) to command
following (MCS plus; Bruno et al., 2011; Kondziella et al., 2017). Patients who continue
to improve and become able to communicate or appropriately use functional objects are
considered to have emerged from a minimally conscious state (EMCS; Giacino et al.,
2018b; Lammi et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2020).
There are two other neurological conditions that mimic the behavioural dysfunctions seen
in the vegetative state. The first, Locked-in Syndrome (LIS), occurs most frequently after
brainstem stroke (Patterson & Grabois, 1986; Young, 2014). Like other types of severe
brain injury, these patients will present in hospital with a decreased level of
consciousness and remain non-responsive for days or weeks (Laureys et al., 2009).
However, these patients will gradually regain conscious awareness but experience
protracted quadriplegia, lower cranial nerve paralysis, and mutism due to the location of
their injury (Gütling et al., 1996; Laureys, Pellas, Van Eeckhout, Ghorbel, Schnakers,
Perrin, Berré, et al., 2005; Young, 2014). Therefore, patients with LIS are fully conscious
but unable to move or speak, making early identification of their awareness exceptionally
challenging. The second condition, Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), is a rare—but
usually transient—autoimmune disorder that damages the peripheral nervous system.
Severe cases of GBS can cause ascending peripheral paralysis and lead to respiratory
arrest, which can be fatal without the aid of mechanical ventilation (Progress et al., 2012;
Shahrizaila et al., 2021). Notably, GBS does not appear to affect conscious awareness,
vision, or hearing in most patients (Leonhard et al., 2019). As such, severe GBS, like LIS,
can result in a state of hidden or “covert” awareness (i.e., without behaviour). While there
are clear clinical distinctions between the clinical profiles of LIS, GBS, and DOC, their
specific diagnostic criteria are often much less straightforward.
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1.3 Behavioural diagnosis in disorders of consciousness
DOC are diagnosed using standardized behavioural measures of awareness like the GCS
(Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) and the CRS-R (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). The GCS is used
to quantify the severity of head injury and diagnose acute coma. It is divided into three
subscales: eye-opening, verbal responses to prompts from emergency care specialists, and
motor responses to stimulation and commands (Bernat, 2006; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976;
Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). GCS scores can range from 2T – 15, with scores below 9
indicating moderate to severe head injury with corresponding cognitive dysfunction and
impaired awareness. The GCS is commonly administered on-site to rapidly assess
patients with head injury and in hospital to track their recovery over time. Once patients
recover from a coma, the CRS-R can be used to detect ongoing impairments in conscious
awareness (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974).
The CRS-R is a standardized neuropsychological assessment of awareness. It is divided
into six subscales measuring visual, auditory, verbal, and motor function as well as a
patient’s level of arousal and communication ability (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). The
subscales of the CRS-R are organized hierarchically where the first item on each scale
tests reflex functions within each domain, and later items assess command following and
cognitively-mediated behaviour (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Schnakers, Perrin, et al.,
2009). Scores on the CRS-R range from 0 – 23, with lower scores indicating more
severely impaired awareness (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). The CRS-R provides
behavioural diagnostic criteria for the vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, and
emergence from a minimally conscious state based on a patient’s level of responsiveness
during examination (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009).
This assessment should be administered regularly to track a patient’s level of function on
a day-to-day basis and to detect signs of recovery over time. This is particularly
important during the post-acute period when the likelihood of recovery is highest
(Bagnato et al., 2017; Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Noé et al., 2019; Pignat et al., 2016)
Currently, behavioural measures of awareness are the gold standard; neuropsychological
assessments like the GCS and the CRS-R are the only clinically accepted tools to
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diagnose DOC (Giacino et al., 2009; Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Teasdale & Jennett,
1974). However, behavioural assessment is severely confounded by the sheer scope of
serious brain injury. Perceptual, cognitive, and psychomotor dysfunctions are prevalent in
cases of severe brain injury, which may outwardly present as a genuine lack of conscious
awareness (Monti, Coleman, et al., 2010; Owen, 2008). Failure to respond during
behavioural examinations may indicate any number of neuropsychological dysfunctions,
including, but not limited to, those affecting awareness. Clinical diagnoses made on the
basis of behaviour, therefore, may reflect these dysfunctions rather than provide an
accurate description of a patient’s conscious state.
In fact, research over the last three decades has repeatedly demonstrated that the rate of
misdiagnosis in DOC, and of the vegetative state specifically, is alarmingly high, with
some estimates exceeding 40% (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993; Kondziella et
al., 2016; Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009). Additionally, similarities in the
clinical presentations of LIS, GBS, and DOC further highlight the limitations of
behavioural assessments. For example, patients with LIS often (but not always; Bauer et
al., 1979; Carrai et al., 2009; Schnakers, Perrin, et al., 2009) regain control of vertical eye
movement, but this may go undetected by clinical staff for extended periods (Bauer et al.,
1979; Ragazzoni et al., 2000; Schnakers, Perrin, et al., 2009). Moreover, if not for the
progressive nature of GBS, the resulting condition could be challenging to distinguish
from DOC like coma or the vegetative state on the basis of behaviour alone (Formisano
et al., 2013). Misdiagnosis in DOC has profound, far-reaching implications. Beyond
(incorrectly) informing medical management and treatment, misdiagnosis has the
alarming potential to erroneously inform decisions around end-of-life care (Graham et al.,
2015; Schnakers et al., 2009; but see Wilkinson, Kahane, Horne, & Savulescu, 2009). It
is therefore essential that we develop valid, reliable tools to assess conscious awareness
without recourse to overt behaviour. One field of research that is leading the way in this
regard is cognitive neuroscience (Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Owen, 2013).
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1.4 Brain-based assessments of awareness
After severe brain injury, standardized behavioural assessments of awareness evaluate a
patient’s ability to respond to environmental stimuli and verbal commands; measures like
the CRS-R and the GCS approach this hierarchically to assess a patient’s specific level of
function (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). For example, responses to
simple stimuli (e.g., flexion withdrawal from applied pressure) reflect intact sensory
function, whereas command following (e.g., functional object use) demonstrates the
capacity to meaningfully interpret speech and execute an appropriate response.
Importantly, these latter processes cannot occur without conscious awareness (but see
Huang et al., 2018). In the context of behavioural assessment, however, command
following is contingent on behavioural output, which can be challenging, if not
impossible, for patients with injury-induced motor impairments (Cavaliere et al., 2014;
Osborne et al., 2015). Moreover, impaired sensory processing or neuropsychological
disorders like aphasia could limit a patient’s comprehension of verbal commands and
prevent an appropriate motor response when otherwise possible (Fellinger et al., 2011;
Gibson et al., 2014; Monti, 2012). Functional neuroimaging, on the other hand, can
bypass the behavioural requirements of current assessment protocols and enable us to
examine perception, cognition, and command following in patients with DOC at the level
of the brain (Giacino et al., 2018a; Owen, 2008, 2013).

1.4.1

Covert command following and active tasks

Technologies like positron emission tomography (PET), electroencephalography (EEG),
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have been used extensively to
characterize the different neurophysiological profiles of DOC (Laureys, 2005; Laureys et
al., 2001; Laureys, Antoine, et al., 2002; Menon et al., 1998). Many studies have
examined resting-state brain activity, evoked responses, and cortical processing in DOC
but Owen and colleagues (2006) were among the first to use functional neuroimaging to
probe conscious awareness directly. In this landmark study, Owen et al. used an fMRI
motor imagery paradigm to investigate neural, rather than behavioural, command
following. During scanning, they instructed healthy participants to imagine playing a
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vigorous game of tennis or to imagine walking through the rooms of their home. They
found that tennis imagery reliably increased blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD)
activity in the supplementary motor cortex—an area involved in coordinating complex
motor movements. In contrast, spatial navigation increased BOLD activation in regions
involved in spatial memory and attention like the parahippocampal gyrus, posterior
parietal lobule, and lateral premotor cortex (Owen et al., 2006). They then asked one
patient who was thought to be in a vegetative state to perform the same imagery task.
Contrary to her diagnosis, she consistently and reliably produced patterns of neural
activity that were statistically indistinguishable from healthy controls. Importantly, the
findings from a follow-up study demonstrated that hearing the instructions alone was
insufficient to produce the same patterns of BOLD activation observed in healthy
controls and the patient; participants had to actively engage in the imagery task to
produce a response (Owen et al., 2007). From these results, Owen et al. concluded that
this patient, though behaviourally non-responsive, was, in fact, entirely aware (Owen et
al., 2006, 2007).
In the years since, Owen and colleagues’ “covert” command following task has been used
in larger cohorts of DOC patients and adapted for novel uses. For instance, Monti et al.
(2010) found that 5 of 54 (9%) DOC patients scanned with fMRI could willfully
modulate their neural activity during the motor imagery task. Moreover, they mapped the
tennis and spatial navigation imagery to “yes” and “no” responses and established
functional communication with one patient who remained entirely unresponsive during
bedside behavioural assessment (Monti, Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2010). Additionally,
Cruse and colleagues (2011) found similar results when testing a comparable bedside
version of this paradigm. Indeed, Cruse et al. detected imagined movements (e.g.,
“Imagine squeezing your right hand/wiggling all of your toes”) in 3 of 16 (19%) DOC
patients using EEG—a low cost, portable, and widely available neuroimaging device
(Cruse, Chennu, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2012). More recently, Edlow et al. (2017)
reported that 4 of 8 (50%) patients with acute DOC could reliably perform hand squeeze
imagery in fMRI, including two patients in an acute coma (i.e., eyes closed, behaviorally
non-responsive).
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Motor imagery tasks are a highly effective method to identify residual awareness in some
DOC patients. However, the proportion of responders is considerably lower than the
estimated rates of misdiagnosis (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993; Schnakers,
Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009). This may be due, in part, to the high cognitive demands
of mental imagery; having to repeatedly imagine complex actions may be challenging for
patients with DOC (Cruse et al., 2011a; Naci et al., 2014). One way to address this issue
is to build from these earlier techniques (i.e., use cognition as a proxy of overt behaviour)
and develop novel neuroimaging assessments that incorporate different aspects of neural
and cognitive function. For example, a case study by Monti et al. (2013) describes one
non-responsive individual who could direct their visual attention on command—as
indexed by changes in BOLD activity in the visual cortex—to correctly focus on one of
two competing visual stimuli. Similarly, Naci and Owen (2013) found task-related
modulations of hemodynamic activity in three DOC patients (two minimally conscious,
one vegetative) corresponding to volitional shifts in auditory attention.
Like motor imagery, identifying neural correlates of top-down attention can provide
strong evidence of covert awareness; selective attention cannot be deployed or controlled
in the absence of conscious awareness (Gibson et al., 2016; Monti et al., 2013; Naci et al.,
2013; Naci & Owen, 2013). Yet, also like motor imagery, attentional modulation and
similar “active” tasks are not ideal for patients with severe brain injury. During active
paradigms, patients are tasked with modulating their neural activity in a highly
circumscribed manner, at a specific time, for a pre-determined duration, and often
multiple times across trials (Møller et al., 2020). Each of these factors compounds the
cognitive demands of the task and its complexity, which can increase to patient fatigue
and lead to inconsistent responding (Berlingeri et al., 2019; Cruse et al., 2011a; Møller et
al., 2020). The results from a recent meta-analysis on neuroimaging in DOC suggest this
as well, with studies that use active tasks reporting evidence of preserved conscious
awareness in just 24% of patients (Kondziella et al., 2016). In sum, while active tasks can
provide clear evidence of covert awareness, they may not be suitable for all patients with
DOC (Kondziella et al., 2016; Møller et al., 2020).
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1.4.2

Passive paradigms and diagnostic classification

Studies that use “passive” neuroimaging tasks report evidence of preserved conscious
awareness in 38% of DOC patients—more closely approximating the rate estimated rate
of misdiagnosis (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993; Kondziella et al., 2016;
Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009). Passive neuroimaging paradigms do not
require patients to perform a task or willfully modulate their neural activity. Instead,
passive tasks aggregate spontaneous (i.e., rest) or evoked activity to assess perceptual
processing, cognitive function, and covert awareness. Resting-state neuroimaging, in
particular, has been used extensively to describe the neurophysiological deficits of DOC.
Indeed, resting-state EEG, PET, and fMRI activity played an essential role in linking
neural dysfunction to the behavioural impairments observed in disorders like coma and
the vegetative state (Laureys et al., 2001, 2004; Laureys, Antoine, et al., 2002; Owen et
al., 2002; Owen & Coleman, 2007).
More recently, advances in neuroimaging technologies and computational analysis
techniques have enabled researchers to extract hidden features from resting-state activity
to better inform diagnosis and prognosis in DOC. A study by Chennu et al. (2017), for
instance, demonstrated that EEG spectral connectivity at rest corroborates behavioural
assessments of awareness and correlates strongly with glucose metabolism in patients
with DOC. Moreover, EEG network connectivity predicted outcomes at one year and,
crucially, detected neural markers of preserved awareness in unresponsive patients who
would later be re-diagnosed as minimally conscious (Chennu et al., 2017). In critical care
settings, too, resting-state neuroimaging has been associated with quality of outcome. For
example, O’Donnell et al. (2021) found that mean EEG alpha power improved prognostic
accuracy at three months in patients with acute DOC, relative to clinical measures alone.
Passive neuroimaging paradigms can also include evoked and event-related designs.
These involve presenting patients with auditory, visual, or somatosensory stimuli to
assess their automatic neural responses (Beukema et al., 2016; Gibson et al., 2016;
Laureys, Faymonville, et al., 2002; Owen et al., 2005). Evoked and event-related
paradigms are often organized hierarchically to examine different levels of neural
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function—from basic sensory processes to those that are cognitively mediated. A
foundational study by Kotchoubey et al. (2005) used this hierarchical approach to
investigate cortical processing in a cohort of vegetative and minimally conscious patients.
Briefly, they recorded patients’ EEG activity during a passive auditory processing task
and examined the corresponding event-related potentials (ERPs) to increasingly complex
stimuli. They found that most patients showed the classic N1 – P2 complex indicative of
primary auditory processing during trials with simple tones. However, fewer than half
produced a mismatch negativity or a P3 attentional orienting response which would
signal the detection of deviant “oddball” stimuli embedded in repeating auditory patterns.
Finally, only 18% of patients showed an N400 semantic error detection response during
trials with incongruent word pairs (e.g., “chair – mouse” vs. “chair – table”) or
anomalous sentences (e.g., “I drink tea with shoes”).
More recent studies have reported similar results using comparable passive EEG tasks.
Beukema et al. (2016), for example, found that 44% of chronic DOC patients produced
ERPs indicative of speech-noise differentiation, whereas just 6% showed an N400 to
incongruent word pairs. Additionally, Sokoliuk and colleagues (2021) demonstrated that
EEG inter-trial phase coherence during a passive speech tracking task—a measure of
conscious semantic processing—improved the accuracy of prognosis in acute DOC.
Specifically, patients who produced the appropriate (i.e., similar to healthy controls)
neural response to auditory phrases and sentences had higher scores on the Glasgow
Outcome Scale Extended (GOSE; Teasdale et al., 1998) at 3 and 6 months than those
who did not. Taken together, these findings suggest that a significant majority of patients
with chronic and acute DOC experience persistent impairments in cognitive functions
like attention and semantic processing (Beukema et al., 2016; B. Kotchoubey et al., 2005;
Sokoliuk et al., 2021). While this does not apply to all patients, novel neuroimaging
assessments should take these considerations into account.
Passive neuroimaging paradigms can be extremely useful to identify specific neural and
cognitive dysfunctions in DOC patients, both at the group level (e.g., common
impairments in the vegetative state) and among individual patients (Beukema et al., 2016;
Kotchoubey et al., 2005; O’Donnell et al., 2021). At the same time, they can also uncover

13

neural evidence of preserved function, which can further inform clinical diagnosis and
prognostication of outcome (Chennu et al., 2017; Kondziella et al., 2016; O’Donnell et
al., 2021; Pauli et al., 2020). Nevertheless, resting state and evoked or event-related
designs have notable limitations. First, the scope of resting-state neuroimaging is highly
constrained; little can be gleaned about the conscious experiences of DOC patients from
neural activity at rest. Likewise, evoked and event-related designs share some of the same
practical and methodological limitations as active ones. For example, evoked and eventrelated tasks often use multiple stimulus types to compare levels of function, each
requiring several trials to detect a neural response (Beukema et al., 2016; Cruse et al.,
2011b; B. Kotchoubey et al., 2005). While this may not affect assessments of lower-level
processes (e.g., primary sensory function), decreased attention, vigilance, or arousal over
time could increase the likelihood of null findings during more cognitively demanding
trials, irrespective of a patient’s level of awareness (Berlingeri et al., 2019; Kondziella et
al., 2016). More broadly, evoked or event-related activity is a proxy measure of
perceptual and cognitive ability; how well these generalize to other contexts is not well
understood.
Limitations notwithstanding, decades of neuroimaging research in chronic and acute
DOC have produced a remarkable number of brain-based assessments that examine a
wide range of physiological, neural, and cognitive domains. While the specific techniques
vary considerably, most assessments share one of two goals: 1) to elucidate the
etiological and physiological factors that contribute to the development and preservation
of DOC or 2) to improve diagnostic and prognostic accuracy using neuroimaging. To an
extent, both lines of research are primarily concerned with clinical classification in DOC;
for example, whether identifying the neurophysiological differences between the
vegetative and minimally conscious state (Goal 1) or detecting residual awareness in
behaviourally non-responsive patients and upgrading their clinical status (Goal 2). These
approaches have contributed significantly to our understanding of DOC and have led to
marked improvements in patient welfare. However, to date, relatively few studies have
aimed to characterize the experience of these patients; to examine what it is like to be in
this altered state of awareness. Neural assessments of DOC typically focus on discrete
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responses to contrived or unnatural stimuli rather than examine wholistic neural
processes. This approach limits our ability to extrapolate a patient’s true level of
cognitive function outside of these narrow contexts (Naci et al., 2014, 2015). One way to
address this is to use more naturalistic assessments of cognitive function and conscious
experience in patients with DOC.

1.4.3

Naturalistic neuroimaging paradigms

Naturalistic experimental paradigms mimic real-world situations or use commonplace
stimuli like music, movies, or stories that readily capture and sustain attention. Unlike
active tasks or event-based designs, naturalistic paradigms use dynamic,
multidimensional, and continuous stimuli. Movies are an excellent example; they contain
complex auditory and visual information that rapidly changes within and between scenes.
One feature, in particular, that makes movies unique is their plot. Movies unfold
dynamically around a central narrative that, itself, contains several elements that
transcend its physical and semantic properties (i.e., audio-visual information, dialogue).
Properties like a movie’s suspense, for instance, are inferred by the viewer from narrative
cues and executive processes like working memory and theory of mind—understanding
what characters do and do not know about themselves, their circumstances, or other
characters. Importantly, to experience these “higher-order” properties, viewers must
attend to the movie and comprehend its plot—processes that require conscious awareness
(Naci et al., 2014, 2015).
Despite their dynamic and complex nature, movies tend to elicit a consistent neural
response across individuals (Chen et al., 2017; Hasson et al., 2010; Naci et al., 2014;
Nguyen et al., 2017). Indeed, Hasson et al. (2004) found that neural activity
“synchronized” across participants during naturalistic viewing conditions (i.e., moviewatching). In this study, they presented a 30-minute clip from the feature film “The
Good, The Bad, and The Ugly” to a group of healthy participants during an fMRI scan.
Using an inter-subject correlations (ISCs) analysis—a procedure that uses the
hemodynamic time course of a voxel in one subject to predict activity in the
corresponding voxel in another—they determined that, on average, nearly 30% of the
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cortical surface was significantly correlated across the group during the movie. This
“synchronization” included most of the primary visual and auditory cortices, as well as
somatosensory and multimodal association areas, and regions of the cingulate gyrus.
Crucially, they did not find any significant correlations across participants during a
resting-state control condition, demonstrating that inter-subject synchronization is not a
natural state of the brain but rather one driven by the movie (Hasson et al., 2004).
Hasson and colleagues also examined the time course of ISCs within activated regions to
track neural synchronization over the duration of the movie. Using the temporal ISCs,
they reconstructed the events of the film that significantly increased ISCs in specific
brain regions. For example, they found peak ISCs in the fusiform gyrus during close-ups
on characters’ faces, whereas ISCs in the post-central sulcus were highest for scenes with
hands performing various motor tasks (Hasson et al., 2004). Bartels and Zeki (2004a,
2005) also reported comparable results using different movie stimuli, suggesting that this
phenomenon is not constrained to a single stimulus. Overall, Hasson et al. and Bartels
and Zeki not only demonstrated that participants’ neural activity synchronized across the
brain during movie-watching tasks but that it does so in a highly coordinated manner to
code the individual features of each scene. From these studies, however, it remained
unclear whether higher-order properties of movies like suspense were similarly processed
across individuals.
Naci et al. (2014) aimed to address this question by investigating which cortical networks
coded different aspects of the movie-watching experience, including suspense. Like
Hasson et al. (2004), Naci and colleagues calculated ISCs across a group of 12
individuals who watched an abridged version of Alfred Hitchcock’s “Bang! You’re
Dead” during an fMRI scan. The film (described in detail in Chapter 2) depicts a boy
who finds his uncle’s revolver and plays with it as it were a toy (e.g., pointing it at other
characters, spinning the chamber, pulling the trigger). The other characters in the film do
not know the boy has replaced his toy gun with a real one, and the viewers do not know,
moment to moment, whether the chamber of the gun is loaded. In this way, Hitchcock
masterfully builds suspense using narrative elements of the movie—those that require

16

executive processes like theory of mind, working memory, and prediction of future
events—rather than its physical properties (e.g., audio volume).
Naci and colleagues (2014) hypothesized that, in addition to sensory areas, frontoparietal
“executive” regions of the brain—those associated with cognitive processes like
attention, working memory, and theory of mind—would synchronize across viewers.
Using the ISCs analysis, they found significant brain-wide neural synchronization across
participants during the movie, spanning primary and secondary sensory areas, association
cortices, and areas of the frontal and parietal lobes. However, significant ISCs in
frontoparietal executive regions are not, in themselves, indicative of shared processing of
the movie’s suspense; language processing, eye movements, and multimodal sensory
integration involve these regions as well. To rule out the possibility that these processes
contributed significantly to frontoparietal synchronization, Naci et al. also presented a
scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead” to the same participants. This version
consisted of 1s clips of the movie that Naci and colleagues pseudo-randomly rearranged
to eliminate any semblance of the plot. When they compared the map of ISCs between
conditions, they found significantly higher synchronization frontoparietal areas of the
cortex during the intact movie. Finally, they did not find any significant inter-subject
neural synchronization during a resting-state control condition, lending additional support
to the findings of Hasson and colleagues (2004).
Using a group-level independent components analysis (ICA), Naci et al. (2014) explored
which cortical networks—rather than individual regions—reliably synchronized across
viewers. They grouped the independent components into five spatially distinct functional
networks: auditory, frontoparietal, visual, motor, and precuneus. Single-subject ICA
verified that the group-level ISCs observed in these networks were reliable across
subjects, and a leave-one-out procedure validated that the time course of the components
remained significantly correlated across all participants. While the auditory network
explained the most variance in ISCs at the single-subject level, the components of the
frontoparietal network ranked second-highest during the intact movie condition. These
findings supported the hypothesis that executive processes drove a significant proportion
of the ISCs across the group (Naci et al., 2014).
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Naci and colleagues took this one step further by correlating the time course of the
movie’s executive load to the ISCs in the frontoparietal network. To accomplish this,
they asked an independent group of volunteers to watch “Bang! You’re Dead” while
performing the sustained attention to response task (SART). The SART is a dual-task
variant of the go-no-go paradigm where participants provide a speeded-key press
response to hearing “go” numbers (1 – 7 and 9) but withhold a response to a “no-go”
number (8). The SART assumes that executive functions like attention, working memory,
and motor inhibition are finite resources. Increased executive demands during the movie
(i.e., during peak periods of suspense) would, therefore, deplete these resources and
decrease accuracy during the task (Manly et al., 1999). When they analyzed the response
characteristics from participants over time, they found that shorter reaction times reliably
preceded a failure to withhold a response to the “no-go” number. This indicated a
transition to automatic responding (i.e., reduced cognitive control) associated with
increased executive load during the movie. Naci et al. used the results from the SART as
a regressor in their fMRI data and found that these changes in reaction times significantly
predicted the time course of activity in the frontoparietal executive network.
After finding that objective measures of executive load predicted frontoparietal activation
during the movie, Naci and colleagues (2014) investigated the influence of suspense on
frontoparietal function directly. For this analysis, they asked an independent group of
volunteers to rate how much suspense they felt during 2s segments of “Bang! You’re
Dead” from least suspenseful to most suspenseful. Like the SART, continuous suspense
ratings provide an index of the movie’s executive demands over time. Suspense develops
when viewers process the higher-order elements of an engaging film and use these to
form and update models of each character’s mental state, understand the potential
consequences of their actions, and predict the outcome trajectories of the story. Feelings
of suspense, then, suggest significant deployment of executive resources like attention,
working memory, and theory of mind necessary to follow the plot of a movie. Naci et al.
found that suspense ratings of “Bang! You’re Dead” were tightly correlated between
individuals suggesting a similar conscious experience of the movie and, when used as a
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regressor in the fMRI analyses, predicted the time course of activity in frontoparietal
executive regions.
Overall, these findings highlight the significant contributions of the frontoparietal
executive network during movie-watching (Naci et al., 2014). Additionally, significant
ISCs in frontoparietal BOLD activity during the intact version of the “Bang! You’re
Dead” (or rest) suggested that participants were comparably engaged in the higher-order
features of the movie, rather than simply responding to its sensory properties. Naci and
colleagues then tested whether frontoparietal activity elicited during the movie could be
used to assess awareness in patients with DOC. For the last experiment of this study,
Naci et al. presented “Bang! You’re Dead” to two behaviourally non-responsive patients
while recording their BOLD activity using fMRI.
Patient 1 was rendered behaviourally non-responsive by progressive encephalopathy.
Repeated bedside assessments resulted in behavioural diagnoses that fluctuated between a
vegetative state and a minimally conscious state; she exhibited intermittent evidence of
visual tracking, but this was unreliable across assessments. However, given the
behavioural constraints of measures like the CRS-R, it was entirely possible that she
retained some degree of awareness but simply could not express it. If this were the case,
perhaps she would show brain-based evidence of residual conscious processing during
the movie task. Naci et al. (2014) presented “Bang! You’re Dead” to Patient 1 during an
fMRI scan and used the same single-subject components analysis to compare her neural
activity to the group of healthy controls. They found significant neural synchronization
between Patient 1 and the control group in the auditory network but not in visual or
frontoparietal regions. While this suggested that she retained residual auditory function, it
was unclear whether this information reached her awareness; cortical reactivity to
auditory stimuli is typically preserved in patients with DOC, but this activity is generally
confined to primary sensory regions (Boly et al., 2004; Henriques et al., 2016; Laureys et
al., 2000).
Patient 2 suffered a hypoxic brain injury leading to coma. The coma resolved after three
weeks but he remained behaviourally non-responsive and was diagnosed as being in a
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vegetative state. However, more recent behavioural assessments suggested that his
diagnosis, like Patient 1, fluctuated between a vegetative state and a minimally conscious
state. Naci et al. (2014) repeated the single-subject components analysis on the fMRI data
from Patient 2 during the movie, which revealed significant ISCs in auditory, visual, and
frontoparietal cortical networks. While this alone suggested that he could process the
higher-order narrative elements of “Bang! You’re Dead”, the time course of activity in
his frontoparietal network was also significantly correlated to the SART and suspense
ratings data. Altogether, these results strongly suggest that Patient 2 could process the
movie in a way that closely resembled healthy controls and was, thus, consciously aware.
With these results, Naci et al. (2014) demonstrated that the consistency of neural activity
across participants during naturalistic stimulation index, to a certain extent, the similarity
of their conscious experience of the movie. Significant ISCs in the frontoparietal network
during the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead”, combined with their temporal
correspondence to quantitative (SART) and qualitative (suspense ratings) measures of its
executive demands over time, suggested that participants were similarly engaged in the
movie’s narrative. What’s more, this technique revealed neural markers of auditory
processing in two patients with chronic DOC, as well as visual and narrative processing
in one who remained minimally responsive at the time of assessment—without recourse
to overt behaviour, active responding, or multiple trials. In this way, tasks that use
naturalistic stimuli like the one presented by Naci et al. (2014 ) may be an especially
powerful tool to assess sensory function, cognition, and covert awareness in patients with
DOC. However, the findings from Patient 1 raise important questions about the task’s
design.
Both patients met the criteria of minimally conscious on the day of testing. Yet, Naci et
al. (2014) only observed visual and frontoparietal synchronization in Patient 2. Evidence
of auditory synchronization in Patient 1 suggested that she could process the auditory
features of “Bang! You’re Dead” in a way that resembled healthy controls, but not its
visual or narrative elements. This could be due to any number of factors, including a
genuine lack of the cognitive functions required to follow the movie’s plot. However, it
remains possible that Patient 1 suffered residual visual impairments, precluding her from
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experiencing this dimension of the movie (Naci et al., 2014). As “Bang! You’re Dead”
relies heavily on visual information to progress the story, an inability to effectively
process this information could have limited her engagement with the film and her
subsequent frontoparietal response (Naci et al., 2015).
A follow-up study by Naci et al. (2015) aimed to determine whether naturalistic auditory
stimuli alone could yield a similarly robust frontoparietal executive response. Patients
with DOC typically retain auditory function (Boly et al., 2004; Henriques et al., 2016;
Laureys et al., 2000). Therefore, a neural assessments paradigm that relies on auditory
processing may be better suited to most patients. Additionally, reducing the number of
perceptual domains involved during the task (i.e., audio-visual to audio-only) may
minimize its cognitive demands. Using fMRI, Naci et al. piloted two types of auditory
stimuli in a group of healthy volunteers: suspenseful instrumental pieces and a short
audio clip from the movie “Taken”. Naci et al. hypothesized that, despite the absence of
speech or dialogue, the suspenseful nature of the instrumental pieces might be sufficient
to drive a frontoparietal executive response like the one observed for “Bang! You’re
Dead”. The audio clip from “Taken” (described in detail in Chapter 2) depicts a phone
conversation between a father and daughter while she is trying to evade kidnappers. She
is eventually found and taken away, which can be heard by her father on the other end of
the call. Unlike “Bang! You’re Dead”, suspense during “Taken” builds rapidly due to the
nature of the subject matter and is aided by sounds effects and atmospheric music. Like
their previous study, Naci et al. also presented a scrambled version of the “Taken” audio.
This version had been spectrally rotated to preserve the physical characteristic of the
stimulus but remove the speech and dialogue necessary to convey the story.
During the suspenseful instrumental pieces, Naci et al. (2015) found significant ISCs
across bilateral auditory cortices, but this did not extend to frontal or parietal regions.
However, the intact version of “Taken” produced significant brain-wide ISCs across the
group, whereas ISCs remained significant in primary and association cortices during the
scrambled version. A subtraction procedure between the ISCs maps of the intact and
scrambled audio conditions revealed significantly higher inter-subject synchronization in
motor, temporal, frontal and prefrontal, and parietal areas during the intact version of
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“Taken”. Like “Bang! You’re Dead”, group-level ICA uncovered many spatially distinct
components, including those that constitute the frontoparietal executive network. Singlesubject frontoparietal time courses were significantly correlated to the group-level
network and, conversely, the group-level time course predicted frontoparietal activity in
all but one subject after a leave-one-out analysis.

1.5 Summary and Aims
Neural assessments of awareness in patients with DOC have evolved considerably since
Owen et al. (2006) first established contact with one behaviourally non-responsive patient
using fMRI. A multitude of covert command following tasks and active paradigms have
been developed to assess awareness in DOC directly, and several resting state and passive
techniques have been proposed to examine neural function after severe brain injury.
Passive naturalistic paradigms share the strengths of both classes of assessments. Over
two studies, Naci and colleagues (2014, 2015) demonstrated the utility of using
naturalistic movie stimuli to assess frontoparietal executive function—a proxy measure of
awareness—in healthy controls and in patients with chronic DOC. This approach
eschews many of the practical and methodological limitations of previous assessment
techniques; it does not rely on overt behaviour or covert responding. Additionally, this
assessment is rapid, only requiring a single trial, and the stimuli are naturally engaging
but sufficiently complex to investigate higher-order cognitive functions.
However, the use of fMRI in DOC populations presents a number of significant
challenges. First, fMRI scanners are not widely available in hospitals or outpatient care
centers, limiting access for a significant number of patients. The costs associated with
using fMRI, likewise, prohibit routine assessments. Additionally, patients with serious
brain injury often move involuntarily, which can severely contaminate fMRI data, and
many are not medically suitable for fMRI, especially in the acute stages of injury. EEG,
on the other hand, is a low-cost and portable neuroimaging device that can be rapidly
applied at a patient’s bedside. EEG has fewer exclusion criteria than fMRI and is
routinely used in critical care settings and outpatient facilities. Although EEG does not
have the same spatial resolution as fMRI (but see Asadzadeh et al., 2020; Michel &
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Brunet, 2019), its temporal precision can track moment-to-moment changes in neural
activity at millisecond time scales. For these reasons, EEG is an attractive alternative to
fMRI for the routine assessment of awareness in patients with chronic and acute DOC.
However, few studies to date have evaluated the feasibility of using naturalistic EEG
paradigms to index executive processes in DOC patients (Iotzov et al., 2017).
Building upon the work of Naci et al. (2014, 2015, 2018), the primary goal of this thesis
was to develop and validate an EEG assessment of naturalistic processing in patients with
chronic and acute DOC. The following chapters will describe a novel analysis technique
designed to capture ISCs in EEG activity, present normative and patient data to support
the efficacy of this approach, and lay the groundwork for future investigations in a
broader range of clinical populations. All experimental procedures and statistical analyses
were piloted in healthy control participants and validated in patients with chronic and
acute DOC. This thesis is divided into three experimental sections, each with its own
specific motivations and aims, briefly described below.
The study presented in Chapter 2 describes one approach to quantify inter-subject neural
synchronization of EEG activity during “Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken”. This study
predominantly focused on the computational processes of calculating ISCs from grouplevel EEG activity. We present the findings from multiple validation analyses performed
to ensure that ISCs were reliable across participants and indexed the same executive
functions reported by Naci et al. (2014, 2015). These validation steps included a leaveone-out procedure for calculating group-level ISCs, calculating time-resolved ISCs and
correlating these time courses to subjective suspense ratings, and performing a source
localization analysis to uncover the cortical sources of the ISCs during the “Taken” audio.
Finally, we present the results from a cohort of DOC patients who participated in this
EEG assessment and discuss the diagnostic implications of our findings.
For the second study of this thesis, detailed in Chapter 3, we compared ISCs from two
groups of healthy controls—one English-speaking group and one French-speaking
group—who listened to the “Taken” audio in their mother tongue. The motivation for this
study was to determine whether the EEG “Taken” paradigm performed comparably well
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when translated to another language, potentially increasing the range of its application in
DOC patients across Canadian care centers. Here, we describe the results from our ISCs
analysis, as well as a time-resolved version for both groups and examine whether these
correspond to subjective suspense ratings. We also address issues around timing
discrepancies for both sets of stimuli and propose methodological approaches to
appropriately implement this assessment in cohorts of French-speaking DOC patients.
The last study of this thesis is presented in Chapter 4. Here, we examined the feasibility
of applying the EEG “Taken” assessment paradigm to identify covert cognitive function
in patients with severe acute brain injury. We presented the audio to a cohort of acutely
comatose patients1 while they received continuous pharmacological sedation and again
after was withdrawn. We aimed to determine whether the change across three distinct
EEG measures—ISCs, functional connectivity, and cortical source reconstruction—
predicted later outcomes. This study details the computational and statistical procedures
underlying each analysis technique and compares results on each measure to individual
patient outcomes. Finally, we evaluate the prognostic value of the original ISCs analysis
in acutely comatose patients and identify patterns of EEG connectivity and cortical
sources that differentiate patients with good and poor clinical outcomes.

1

Please note that the COVID-19 pandemic severely limited the number of patients that could be enrolled in
this study.
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Chapter 2

2

Individualized assessment of residual cognition in
patients with disorders of consciousness

This chapter has been published elsewhere (citation below) and is reproduced here with
permission from the publisher, Elsevier.

Laforge, G., Gonzalez-Lara, L. E., Owen, A. M., & Stojanoski, B. (2020). Individualized
assessment of residual cognition in patients with disorders of consciousness.
NeuroImage: Clinical, 28(August), 102472. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2020.102472

2.1

Introduction

A small but significant number of patients who survive severe brain injury will progress
to a state of altered awareness known as a disorder of consciousness (DOC). Patients with
DOC exhibit regular periods of wakefulness but produce minimal or inconsistent
behavioural evidence of conscious awareness. This presents a considerable challenge for
clinicians when trying to accurately diagnose a patient’s conscious state, as available
clinical measures like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R; Kalmar and Giacino,
2005) rely on observable behavioural responses to verbal commands. In some cases, a
lack of purposeful behaviour may reflect a true absence of awareness—a condition
known as the vegetative state. However, expert reassessments of DOC patients
consistently show that approximately 40% of these patients are, at least, minimally
conscious (Andrews et al., 1996; Burke, 2002; Childs et al., 1993; Schnakers et al.,
2009). While repeated behavioural assessments may reduce the rate of misdiagnosis of
patients with DOC, acquired cognitive or physiological impairments may still preclude
behavioural expressions of awareness in many patients. Because of these limitations,
novel brain-based assessments have been proposed as an alternative to behavioural
testing.
To date, several studies have demonstrated that neuroimaging techniques, such as
functional MRI (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG), can be used to capture the
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neural correlates of awareness in patients with DOC. For example, Owen et al. (2006)
developed an fMRI motor imagery task to assess “covert” (rather than behavioural)
command-following. In that study, the unique patterns of brain activity elicited by
different types of imagined motor imagery (e.g., playing tennis, spatial navigation) were
used to determine whether patients could correctly modulate their neural activity in
response to specific task instructions. One patient, who appeared to be entirely
vegetative, could reliably produce the appropriate neural response to each imagery
command, providing strong evidence of her awareness. Similar imagery paradigms have
since been used to examine larger cohorts of patients using either fMRI (Monti et al.,
2010) and, more recently, EEG (Cruse et al., 2011). Yet, the active nature of imagined
command-following tasks, much like their behavioural counterparts, requires the
coordination of several cognitive faculties, as well as sustained periods of vigilance and
effort, that may prove difficult for some patients and impossible for others. Indeed, a
recent review found that just 14% of behaviourally non-responsive patients could
modulate their brain activity in response to verbal commands (Kondziella et al., 2016),
which is far lower than the estimated 40% who are known to be misdiagnosed (Andrews
et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993; Schnakers et al., 2009).
As a result, recent studies have moved towards using naturalistic tasks that more closely
mimic real-world activities. Movie-watching has emerged as a particularly useful
paradigm; previous research has shown that watching suspenseful movies such as Alfred
Hitchcock’s “Bang! You’re Dead” produces significant brain-wide correlations between
healthy controls (Hasson et al., 2004, 2010; Naci et al., 2015). This “synchronization”
spans primary sensory regions as well as areas of the frontal and parietal cortices that are
involved in executive functions like theory of mind and attentional control (Naci et al.,
2014, 2015), both of which are necessary to follow the plot of a movie. Naci and
colleagues (2014) capitalized on this phenomenon to create an fMRI movie-watching
paradigm for assessing executive processing in patients with DOC. They showed that the
degree of frontoparietal synchronization between participants during “Bang! You’re
Dead” significantly correlated with measures of suspense and executive load.
Furthermore, the same highly-correlated brain responses occurred in one patient who met
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the behavioural criteria for a vegetative state diagnosis. On this basis, the authors were
able to conclude that the patient was, in fact, aware, despite his behavioural and clinical
profile.
However, for naturalistic approaches to be clinically viable, they must be moved to the
bedside. In this regard, EEG is the ideal neuroimaging tool for assessing residual
cognitive function in patients with DOC; EEG is portable, widely available in clinical
settings, and it minimizes the cost of routine neural assessments, as well as the physical
toll incurred by patients during fMRI testing (Cruse et al., 2011). To this end, we
hypothesized that EEG could be used to assess the level of inter-subject synchronization
(or inter-subject correlations; ISCs), and therefore identify markers of executive
processing in patients with DOC. As such, the aim of this study was to develop a bedside
neuroimaging paradigm to assess ISCs during movie tasks in patients with DOC.

2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1

Patients and controls

We recruited a convenience sample of 13 patients with severe traumatic and nontraumatic brain injuries who met the CRS-R (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005) diagnostic criteria
for DOC (see Table 1 for clinical information). At the time of testing, ten patients met the
clinical criteria for the vegetative state, two were in a minimally conscious state, and one
was diagnosed with Locked-in Syndrome. Informed assent was obtained from substitute
decision-makers and medical care teams for all patients. All healthy participants were
recruited from The Brain and Mind Institute at the University of Western Ontario,
Canada (Appendix A). Twenty-eight healthy volunteers took part in the EEG portion of
this study, and an additional 40 performed a follow-up behavioural task. Informed written
consent was acquired prior to testing.
Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board
and the Non-Medical Research Ethics Board of The University of Western Ontario.
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2.2.2

Procedures

All patients were assessed with the CRS-R on the day of testing. The CRS-R consists of
six subscales evaluating sensory and motor function, communication ability, and level of
arousal, to distinguish patients who are minimally conscious—those who exhibit
intermittent behavioural evidence of awareness—from patients who are in a vegetative
state (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).
We used two suspenseful movie clips to measure ISCs between healthy controls and
individual patients with DOC. The first clip was an 8-minute audiovisual segment from
the Alfred Hitchcock TV movie “Bang! You’re Dead”. Briefly, this scene portrays a
Table 1. Clinical and Demographic Information for Patients with Disorders of
Consciousness

Patient 1
Patient 2
Patient 3
Patient 4
Patient 5
Patient 6
Patient 7
Patient 8
Patient 9
Patient 10
Patient 11
Patient 12
Patient 13

Age at
Sex
Clinical
Etiology
Interval
CRS-R at
Movie
Assessment
Diagnosis
postictus
Assessment
Condition
(years)
(days)
(/23)
(s)
27
Male
VS
TBI
3647
6
Both
41
Male
VS
Anoxia
1148
7
Both
51
Male
LIS
Stroke
1934
15
Both
38
Male
VS
Anoxia
7058
6
TKN
48
Female
VS
TBI
8427
5
Both
60
Male
VS
Anoxia
2463
3
Both
29
Female
MCS
TBI
3252
8
Both
21
Male
VS
TBI
1349
2
Both
15
Female
VS
Anoxia
1072
6
Both
52
Female
VS
Anoxia
3592
5
Both
25
Male
VS
TBI
1198
5
BYD
63
Male
MCS
Anoxia
368
9
BYD
19
Male
VS
Anoxia
314
6
BYD
Note. VS, Vegetative State; MCS, Minimally Conscious State; LIS, Locked-in Syndrome; TBI,
traumatic brain injury; CRS-R, Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; BYD, “Bang! You’re Dead”;
TKN, “Taken”. *denotes significant ISC with controls, p < 0.05; ** denotes significant ISC with
controls for both movie tasks, p < 0.05.

Significant
ISC
TKN*
TKN*
BYD*
**
BYD*
-

5-year-old boy who finds his uncle’s revolver. Being unaware of its danger, the boy
partially loads the gun and plays with it as if it were a normal toy. The viewer (and the
boy himself) is rarely privy to whether the gun has a bullet in its chamber, and suspense
continues to build the longer the boy plays with the gun (e.g., spinning the chamber,
pointing it at others, pulling the trigger). To account for potential visual impairments
among DOC patients, we also used a second clip comprised of a 5-minute audio excerpt
from the movie “Taken. In this clip, the listener hears a phone conversation between a
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father character and his daughter, who is away on vacation. The conversation quickly
changes tone as she becomes aware of kidnappers in her accommodation. The kidnappers
eventually discover where she is hiding and take her away—all of which can be heard
over the father’s end of the call. Unlike “Bang! You’re Dead”, the suspense in this clip
builds much less subtly, relying more on atmosphere and intensity than unpredictability.
This brute-force approach to building suspense was taken into account when initially
testing this clip (Naci et al., 2015), since driving synchronization with audio alone is
more difficult than with visual or multimodal stimuli (Dmochowski et al., 2017; Naci et
al., 2015). Both movies have been rated as highly suspenseful and produce robust ISCs
between healthy volunteers in fMRI (Naci et al., 2014, 2015). We also used two
“scrambled” control stimuli, one for each movie, to separate the neural responses elicited
by the sensory properties of watching or listening to the movies from those involved in
following the plot. The scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead” was generated by
isolating 1s segments of the movie and arranging them in a pseudorandom order, thereby
eliminating the temporal coherence of the narrative (Naci et al., 2014). To create the
scrambled version of “Taken”, the audio was spectrally rotated, which preserved many of
its acoustic features but rendered the speech indecipherable (Naci et al., 2015). The
scrambled movie clips were presented before the intact versions for all patients and
participants to prevent potential carry-over effects of the narrative.
Two separate groups of healthy volunteers were recruited for this study: 13 participants
watched the intact and scrambled versions of “Bang! You’re Dead”, and 15 participants
heard both versions of “Taken”. Individual participants were seated in a dimly lit room
and instructed to watch or listen attentively to the stimuli. The task instructions and
design remained the same when testing patients with DOC. Each patient was presented
with one or both movie types (12 “Bang! You’re Dead”; ten “Taken”; nine both) with the
presentation order counterbalanced between patients.
Stimulus presentation was controlled with the Psychtoolbox plugin for Matlab (Brainard,
1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) on a 15″ Apple MacBook Pro. The laptop screen
was used to present the video component of “Bang! You’re Dead” but remained blank
(black) during “Taken”. All audio was presented binaurally to participants at a
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comfortable listening volume through Etymotics ER-1 in-ear headphones. The EEG data
were analyzed using EEGLAB software (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The data were
cleaned following standard preprocessing steps including re-referencing, filtering, and
removal of artifacts (e.g., ocular, motor). Finally, estimates of cortical activity during
“Taken” were computed with the Brainstorm software for MATLAB (Tadel et al., 2011).
Source reconstructions were performed only for “Taken” because of the availability of T1
structural MRI scans among participants in this condition.

2.2.3

EEG acquisition

EEG data were collected using a 129-channel cap (Electrical Geodesics Inc. [EGI],
Oregon, USA). Signals were sampled at 250Hz and referenced online to the vertex (Cz).
Electrode impedances were kept below 50kΩ. Offline processing was performed using
MATLAB software, including custom scripts and the EEGlab toolbox (Delorme &
Makeig, 2004). Offline, the EEG data were re-referenced to the common average and
bandpass filtered from 0.5 - 60Hz (notch at 60Hz). Automatic artifact detection
(EEGLAB) was used to identify bad channels, which were removed, then interpolated
back into the data. We then used an independent components analysis (ICA) to visually
identify patterns of neural activity characteristic of eye and muscle movements which
were removed from the data. The data were also de-spiked to reduce the influence of
aberrant peak amplitudes on further analyses (Dmochowski et al., 2012). EEG
preprocessing was performed separately for each participant, movie, and stimulus
condition.

2.2.4

Statistical analyses

We performed a correlated components analysis (CorrCA; Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki
et al., 2016) to calculate ISCs from the EEG data. CorrCA identifies linear combinations
of stable and distinct patterns of brain activity to generate “components” that are
maximally correlated (using Pearson’s rho) between participants (see Cohen and Parra,
2016; Ki et al., 2016 for calculations). Here, the components serve a similar purpose to
those extracted from fMRI data using group-level ICA, in that they reflect common
patterns of neural activity across participants. Since components derived by the CorrCA
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are rank-ordered by the magnitude of their correlations, we focused on the top-ranked
component for each movie condition.
A CorrCA was first computed in healthy controls for each movie (“Bang! You’re Dead”
and “Taken”) and condition (intact, scrambled). In computing the CorrCA (Dmochowski
et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016), the spatial weights of the top component are back-projected
onto the EEG recordings from individual participants, creating a spatial filter of the data,
which isolates the underlying signal of the component and its activity over time. These
per-subject component time courses are then correlated between all pairs of participants,
and the mean of the pairwise correlations for each individual participant represents their
overall ISCs; that is, how “synchronized” each participant is to the group as a whole.
Leave-one-out cross-validation and permutation testing were then used to determine the
reliability of the components as well as evaluate the statistical significance of individual
ISCs during each movie. The leave-one-out approach involved iteratively removing one
participant from the group and recomputing the CorrCA (which generated new
components), and the extracted time courses for each iteration of the CorrCA were later
used to compute ISCs. That is, we repeated the CorrCA 13 times for “Bang! You’re
Dead” and 15 times for “Taken”–leaving out a different participant during each
recalculation–and computed ISCs between the left-out participant and the set of
participants included in each iteration of the CorrCA. This also enabled us to compare the
components topographies generated by the CorrCA across subsets of the group and
measure the average degree of synchronization for each participant across these subsets.
This approach ensured that the components extracted using CorrCA and the subsequent
ISCs between participants were unbiased and reliable.
Permutation testing was then used to establish thresholds of statistical significance for the
ISCs of individual participants. This was done by phase-shifting the correlation
coefficients between participants (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016; Theiler et al.,
1992) and performing a 1000 iteration resampling procedure to create individual null
distributions. The top 5% of the distributions formed the significance thresholds for each
participant (p < 0.05 FDR corrected). The leave-one-out and permutation analysis also
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served as a statistical benchmark for assessing the extent to which individual DOC
patients were synchronized to healthy controls during the movies. The analysis followed
a similar procedure with one exception: rather than computing new CorrCA components
using patient data, we back-projected the initial components from healthy controls onto
their EEG. In this way, we could directly compare the neural activity from patients to the
healthy group.

2.2.5

Suspense ratings and temporal inter-subject correlations

To verify that the component extracted by the CorrCA represented neural activity
associated with executive processing of the plot (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Cohen and
Parra, 2016, Poulsen et al., 2017), we examined whether the temporal fluctuations of
ISCs coincided with subjective ratings of suspense during both movies. To do this, we
first collected suspense ratings for “Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken” from two
independent samples of 20 healthy volunteers. Participants rated how much “suspense”
they felt at 2s intervals throughout the movie, ranging from 1 (least) to 10 (most).
Individual ratings were then averaged to create a group-level time course of suspense
ratings specific to each movie. Second, we used a sliding window technique—set at 2s
intervals to align with the sampling frequency of the suspense ratings—to identify time
periods when the EEG activity from each participant was significantly correlated to the
mean of the group (based on a leave-one-out approach). Significance was established
against null distributions that were generated for each participant at every time window
(2s) throughout the movie by randomly shuffling the component time course,
recomputing the ISCs 1000 times, and retaining the value that corresponded to the 95th
percentile. ISCs that exceeded this threshold at each time point were considered
statistically significant. Group-level temporal ISCs were then calculated by summing the
number of participants who were significantly synchronized to the group at every time
point. Finally, we correlated the time course of the significant group-level temporal ISCs
for each movie and condition (intact and scrambled versions) to the suspense ratings from
the intact stimuli using both frequentist and Bayesian statistics.
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2.2.6

Component source modelling

For those participants who listened to the “Taken” clip, we performed an exploratory
source localization analysis using Brainstorm (Tadel et al., 2011) and a spatiotemporal
regression (Custo et al., 2014) to uncover the potential cortical sources of the
components. Head and cortical models were constructed using T1 weighted structural
MRI images and automatic (OpenMEEG) boundary-element modelling (Gramfort et al.,
2010; Mosher et al., 1999). To improve the accuracy of the source estimates, electrode
placements were captured for each participant during EEG acquisition using EGI’s
Geodesic Photogrammetry System and co-registered to their corresponding head models.
Sources were reconstructed from full EEG recordings from healthy controls for the intact
and scrambled versions of “Taken” using a Tikhonov-regularized weighted minimum
norm estimate with normalized current density maps. Individual cortical models and
source estimates were then normalized to MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) standard
space. A spatiotemporal regression analysis (Custo et al., 2014) was performed to
identify cortical sources that correlate with the group-level component time courses for
each version of “Taken”. We then repeated the regression using the auditory envelope of
the stimulus. Significant beta maps (corrected for multiple comparisons) were exported to
SPM (Statistical Parametric Mapping), where we computed group-level t contrasts
between the intact (intact > scrambled) and scrambled (intact < scrambled) audio
conditions. This yielded contrast maps of the significant differences in functional activity
associated with the activity of the top components from the CorrCA.

2.3 Results
2.3.1

Neural synchronization during naturalistic audiovisual
stimulation

For the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead”, the CorrCA produced a component
topography that showed extensive frontal negativity and widespread posterior positivity
among healthy controls (Figure 1A). This component was remarkably reliable between
smaller subsets of control participants (spatial correlations, r > 0.95; Figure 1B), as
demonstrated by the leave-one-out recalculations of the CorrCA. In effect, we found
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nearly identical patterns of neural activity each time we performed the CorrCA,
irrespective of the participants included in the analysis; the group-level component for
“Bang! You’re Dead” was not simply the product of the specific configuration of our
sample but, rather, captured the most common neural response to watching this movie.
The ISCs, likewise, showed a similar degree of reliability. At the group level, the mean
ISCs during “Bang! You’re Dead’ (M = 0.084, SD = 0.053) were significant, t(12) =
5.700, p = 9.98e-5, confirming both that our task was generating inter-subject
synchronization and that our EEG analyses could identify this synchrony. In fact,
between individual participants, we found 85% whose EEG activity was significantly
correlated to the rest of the group during “Bang! You’re Dead” (p < 0.05 FDR corrected;
Figure 1C).
At the group level, the temporal ISCs showed a comparable degree of consistency. We
found that the EEG from healthy controls were significantly synchronized at the same
time points for 25.32% of the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead” (based on
permutation statistics). Moreover, the group-level synchronization at each time point was
significantly correlated to the average suspense ratings throughout the intact movie, r =
0.179, p = 6.00e-3, BF10 = 3.541. This revealed that individuals’ neural activity was most
synchronized at times when the movie was most suspenseful, which suggested, therefore,
that the top CorrCA component reflected executive processing of the movie (Cohen et al.,
2017; Naci et al., 2014).
We then performed the CorrCA on the EEG data from the same 13 healthy controls
during the scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead” to compare the degree of ISCs to
the intact condition. The CorrCA produced a component that closely resembled the intact
condition and was equally consistent across leave-one-out subsets (spatial correlations, r
> 0.95). The group-level mean ISCs (M = 0.071, SD = 0.032) remained significant during
the scrambled movie, t(12) = 8.047, p = 3.54e-6. While this corresponded to previous
fMRI studies (Naci et al., 2014, 2015), we tested whether the components calculated for
each condition reflected similar underlying neural processes. To do this, we backprojected the intact and scrambled components onto the EEG data from the other movie
condition (intact onto scrambled and scrambled onto intact) and recomputed the ISCs.

55

This produced a unique series of ISCs representing the overlap in neural processes
captured by the components in both movie conditions. We predicted that if the
components encompassed the same neural processes, the magnitude of the ISCs would
remain largely unchanged. However, this was not the case. At the group level, we
observed a significant reduction in group-level mean ISCs for both the intact, t(12) =
3.640, p = 3.00e-3, and scrambled movie conditions, t(12) = 2.659, p = 2.10e-2, which
confirmed that, despite displaying similar levels of synchronization, the intact and
scrambled components did not arise from the same underlying processes. As a follow-up,
we ran a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to ensure that this effect was not driven by an interaction
between the different movie conditions and the component projection type (i.e., correct or
incorrect). The ANOVA confirmed a main effect of projection type, F(1,12) = 20.83, p =
7.00e-4 but did not reveal a significant condition by projection type interaction, F(1,12) =
0.73, p = 4.1e-1 (Suppletory Information Figure 1A).
The temporal ISCs revealed that, during the scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead”,
participants’ EEG activity was significantly synchronized for 20.25% of the movie—5%
less than the intact version (Suppletory Information Figure 2 A, B). Although this
reduction in significant temporal ISCs was markedly less pronounced than those reported
by Dmochowski et al. (2012), the temporal ISCs for this condition did not correlate with
the suspense ratings for the intact movie, r = 0.045, p = 4.86e-1, BF10 = 0.103. What this
suggests is that, although participants EEG activity was still synchronized to a
comparable degree during the scrambled version of the movie, this was unrelated to the
underlying elements of the plot, like its suspense (Naci et al., 2014).
Using the component from the intact movie condition, we then calculated ISCs for 12
DOC patients while they watched the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead”. Overall,
25% of patients had EEG activity that was significantly correlated with healthy controls’
during this movie (p < 0.05 FDR corrected; Figure 1D), though the magnitude of their
absolute correlations with controls was markedly lower on average. Notably, all of these
patients met the behavioural criteria for a vegetative diagnosis at the time of testing. We
repeated this procedure using the component topography for the scrambled version of the
movie. Scrambled data were available for 10 of the 12 patients who watched “Bang!
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You’re Dead!”. During the scrambled movie condition, 20% of individual DOC patients’
neural activity was significantly synchronized with controls (p < 0.05 FDR corrected).
While there were a similar number of patients whose neural activity was significantly
correlated with controls’ during either the intact or scrambled condition, there was no
overlap between these patients. Interestingly, the ISCs for three patients increased during
the scrambled movie condition, though the increases for two were comparatively small
relative to the intact condition.

2.3.2

Neural synchronization during naturalistic auditory
stimulation

We applied the same CorrCA procedure to the EEG data from 15 different healthy
controls while they listened to the intact version of “Taken”. The topography of the intact
component showed a posterior negativity and widespread frontal positivity that was
spatially analogous to the intact component from “Bang! You’re Dead” (Figure 2A).
However, this component was much less stable across leave-one-out subsets (spatial
correlations, r > 0.67). Nevertheless, group-level mean ISCs (M = 0.019, SD = 0.009),
remained significant, t(14) = 8.417, p = 7.55e-7, though reduced compared to “Bang!
You’re Dead”, likely owing to the unimodal nature of the clip.
The group-level temporal ISCs showed that participants’ EEG activity was significantly
synchronized throughout 15.79% of the audio and that these periods of synchronization
were significantly correlated with its suspense ratings, r = 0.186, p = 2.00e-1, BF10 =
1.245. Like “Bang! You’re Dead”, this result indicated that the EEG activity was
maximally synchronized at the group level during the most suspenseful points of the
audio clip from “Taken”.
For the scrambled version of “Taken”, the CorrCA produced a component that differed
considerably from the intact version and from either of the components calculated on the
“Bang! You’re Dead” data (see Suppletory Information Figure 3 for topographies).
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Figure 1. Component topographies and inter-subject correlations during “Bang! You’re
Dead”.
A) The spatial weights that maximize Pearson’s correlation (r) between healthy controls
during the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead”. B) The similarity matrix and polaritynormalized component topographies computed from iterative leave-one-out
recalculations of the CorrCA. Spatial correlations are plotted across the scalp
topographies, rather than the typical voltage mappings. Warmer colours indicate higher
r values. C) Mean inter-subject correlations between healthy controls during the intact
version of “Bang! You’re Dead”. Statistical thresholds (blue dashes) were calculated on
a per-subject basis using a permutation test approach. D) Mean inter-subject
correlations between individual patients and the healthy control group during the intact
version of “Bang! You’re Dead”. Statistical thresholds (red/green) were determined on
an individual basis for each patient using a permutation approach. Green thresholds and
asterisks denote significance at p < 0.05. E) The distribution of ISCs for control
participants (blue) and three patients who were significantly correlated to the healthy
group (red) during “Bang! You’re Dead”.
This component was the least consistent between leave-one-out subsets (spatial
correlations, minimum r = -0.44), though group-level mean ISCs (M = 0.016, SD =
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0.009) were significant, t(14) = 7.073, p = 2.00e-1. However, like “Bang! You’re Dead”,
the recalculation of the group-level ISCs after back-projection revealed that the neural
activity underlying these components differed between conditions; we found significant
reductions in ISCs for the intact condition after back-projecting the scrambled
component, t(14) = 6.901, p = 7.28e-6 and, likewise, for the scrambled condition after
back-projecting the intact component, t(14) = 5.612, p = 6.40e-5. Like “Bang! You’re
Dead”, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA revealed a main effect of projection type, F(1,14) =
73.12, p = 6.30e-7, but no significant interaction between the variable, F(1,14) = 2.04, p
= 1.75e-1 (Suppletory Information Figure 1B.)
For the group-level temporal ISCs, we found that participants neural activity
synchronized during only 9.87% of the scrambled version of “Taken”. Moreover, like the
scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead”, the temporal ISCs did not correlate with the
suspense ratings from the intact version of “Taken”, r = 0.107. p = 2.00e-1, BF10 = 0.233,
suggesting again that synchronization among participants in this condition was not plotbased (Suppletory Information Figure 4 A, B).
With the component from the intact version of “Taken”, we calculated the ISCs between
ten patients with DOC and the healthy control group. Here, we found that 30% of patients
produced EEG activity that was significantly correlated with controls during this movie
(Figure 2B). Of these patients, one was diagnosed with Locked-in Syndrome (Table 1),
while the remaining patients met the behavioural criteria for a vegetative state diagnosis.
EEG data from the scrambled audio condition was available for 9 of the 10 patients who
listened to the intact version of “Taken”. Here, two of the nine patients showed increased
ISCs with controls relative to the intact condition. Nevertheless, following the same backprojection procedure, we did not find significant correlations between the EEG activity of
any DOC patients and healthy controls during this condition.
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Figure 2. Component topographies for both movie conditions and inter-subject
synchronization between patients and controls during “Taken”.
A) Maximally correlated components calculated between healthy controls during the
intact versions of “Bang! You’re Dead” (left) and “Taken” (middle), shown for
comparison. Mean inter-subject correlations between individual patients and the healthy
control group during the intact version of “Taken”. Statistical thresholds (red/green)
were determined on an individual basis for each patient using a permutation approach.
Green thresholds and asterisks denote significance at p < 0.05. B) The distribution of
ISCs for control participants (blue) and three patients who were significantly correlated
to the control group (red) during “Taken”.

2.3.3

Source localization

Finally, we performed a source localization analysis on the healthy control data from both
versions of “Taken” to investigate the neural generators of the components. Paired t
contrasts were calculated on the cortical activations that most strongly correlated with the
time courses of the intact and scrambled components. This revealed a significant
difference in overall activation between movie conditions (SPM paired t contrasts at p <
.05) The intact > scrambled contrast showed greater bilateral activation over frontal and
parietal regions (Figure 3A), whereas the scrambled > intact contrast revealed only sparse
activation over anterior regions of the inferior and middle temporal cortices (Figure 3B).
Despite the exploratory nature of this analysis, the differences in cortical activity between
movie conditions closely resembled previous findings in fMRI (Naci et al., 2014, 2015).
To ensure that these results did not simply reflect differences in the auditory
characteristics between the intact and scrambled movie, we performed a follow-up
analysis to identify the brain areas associated with processing the low-level auditory
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properties of “Taken”. Specifically, we contrasted the cortical response to the physical
features of the intact audio (i.e., its pitch, timbre, and loudness—captured by its auditory
envelope) to the activity elicited by the full audio clip (containing speech and the plot).
We performed paired t contrasts between the intact audio > auditory envelope and
auditory envelope > intact audio and found that there was a significant difference
between the overall source activations for each condition, t(14) = 3.79, p = 1.00e-3.
Moreover, the difference maps between contrasts bore a considerable resemblance to the
intact > scrambled localization analysis. From these analyses, we, therefore, concluded
that neither the auditory envelope of the intact version of “Taken”, nor the perceptual
features of the scrambled movie generated the frontoparietal activation observed during
the intact audio condition.

Figure 3. Source reconstruction of the top CorrCA components for the intact and
scrambled versions of “Taken”.
A) Source activations that were significantly correlated with the component time course
from the intact version of “Taken” contrasted against the activity from the scrambled
condition (intact > scrambled). B) Source activations that were significantly correlated
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with the component time course from the scrambled version of “Taken” contrasted
against the activity from the intact condition (intact < scrambled).

2.4 Discussion
Overall, we found that the EEG responses of 38% of DOC patients (four vegetative, one
Locked-in) in this cohort were significantly correlated to those of healthy controls during
at least one of our movie clips. This result suggests that these patients may have retained
or recovered some of the “executive” faculties necessary for processing the plot of the
movie stimuli we used (Naci et al., 2014, 2015). This percentage (38%), is higher than
previous studies that have used neuroimaging and covert command-following (14% of
vegetative patients, 32% of minimally conscious patients; Kondziella et al., 2016). This
potentially speaks to the simplicity of our movie paradigm, as well as the inherent ease
with which we attend to engaging movie stimuli (Dmochowski et al., 2014; Hasson et al.,
2004; Ki et al., 2016; Naci et al., 2015). However, the percentages reported here reflect
findings across a small cohort of DOC patients and should be interpreted with caution
when compared to the larger body of literature. Repeat testing and validation among a
larger sample of DOC patients would be needed before the proportion of cognitively
capable DOC patients reported in this study could be appropriately applied to the
population as a whole.
Although it is challenging to infer the cognitive states of DOC patients from these results
alone, significant correlations in neural activity between these patients and healthy
controls during our movie tasks suggest that they may have been having a comparable
experience of the plot for a number of reasons. In particular, the results from our analysis
of our healthy control data align with previous studies (in both component topography
and the magnitude of ISCs) that used CorrCA to examine the neural processes of
engagement associated with movie-watching (Cohen & Parra, 2016; Dmochowski et al.,
2012; Ki et al., 2016; Poulsen et al., 2017) and, importantly, with those of a recent
investigation of the electrophysiological markers of auditory attention in DOC patients
(Iotzov et al., 2017). In that study, Iotzov et al. recorded EEG activity from patients with
DOC while they listened to a spoken narrative and compared their responses to that of
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healthy controls on three components derived from a CorrCA. At the group level, Iotzov
et al. observed a significant reduction in ISCs for DOC patients compared to control
across all three components and found some evidence that the magnitude of ISCs
corresponded to clinical diagnosis. We also performed three additional analyses to
disentangle the ISCs generated from the sensory properties of the movies from those
driven by the plot. First, we back-projected the components from the intact and
scrambled movies onto the EEG data from the other movie condition (intact onto
scrambled, scrambled onto intact). This created a spatial filter that isolated the neural
signal of the intact component in the scrambled EEG data and vice versa. Had the
components for each condition captured the same neural processes, we would have
expected no change in the ISCs. However, using this method, we found consistent and
significant decreases in mean ISCs for both “Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken”. The
reduction in mean ISCs demonstrated that the components from each movie condition
encompassed different neural processes.
We then compared the time course of inter-subject synchronization, computed using
temporal ISCs, with the suspense ratings for each movie. We found that participants were
maximally synchronized during time windows that corresponded to the most suspenseful
periods of each movie but only during the intact (and not the scrambled) conditions. This
provided further evidence that the components calculated for the intact version of the
movies represented brain activity associated with executive processing necessary to track
the narrative, rather than the sensory properties, of the movies. Lastly, the source
reconstruction of the components from “Taken” revealed a clear separation between the
brain regions involved in processing the intact and scrambled versions of the movie. That
is, the intact component was localized primarily to the frontoparietal cortices, whereas the
scrambled component activity was localized largely to temporal auditory regions,
aligning closely to results shown in fMRI (Hasson et al., 2004; Naci et al., 2014, 2015).
This suggests patients are recruiting the same set of executive processes (i.e., attention,
language processing, memory, and theory of mind; Naci et al., 2014; Cohen and Parra,
2016; Ki et al., 2016) that are essential for plot following.
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How do we know that synchronization between DOC patients and healthy controls is not
the result of some kind of automatic or unconscious processing? While previous studies
on the neural effects of anesthesia have shown that inter-subject neural synchronization
can occur in low-level brain areas in the absence of awareness (Naci et al., 2018), we
contend that automatic or unconscious processing alone cannot explain significant ISCs
during the intact movies in our study. Indeed, the source results for the intact and
scrambled “Taken” components share the same distinct activation patterns found in
similar fMRI paradigms (Naci et al., 2014, 2015). Frontoparietal synchronization has
been shown to correlate strongly with higher-order elements of movie stimuli, like its
plot, which cannot be processed unconsciously (Naci et al., 2018). Furthermore, if ISCs
during the intact movie conditions were primarily sensory-driven, we would expect the
components to index the same neural processes as the scrambled components. Our backprojection analysis determined that this was not the case, despite the sensory properties of
the stimuli being largely the same between conditions. Finally, inter-subject neural
synchronization is not a natural state of the brain; it does not occur when participants are
at rest (Hasson et al., 2004; Naci et al., 2014) and is much weaker in the absence of
focused attention (Ki et al., 2016) or during non-engaging stimuli (Dmochowski et al.,
2012; Hasson et al., 2010).
There are some peculiarities in our patient results that should be addressed. First, the
majority of DOC patients who had significant ISCs with healthy controls were
behaviourally vegetative, not minimally conscious. One factor that may account for this
result relates to data quality; EEG is very susceptible to movement artifacts, which may
have been more prevalent for the minimally conscious patients (who are more likely to
move overall), potentially impacting their ISCs with the healthy group. Similarly, some
percentage of vegetative patients are likely to be covertly aware but simply cannot
express this through their behaviour, whereas minimally conscious patients are, as their
diagnosis suggests, minimally conscious and therefore have limited cognitive, as well as
behavioural capacities. As a result, patients who are behaviourally vegetative but fully
aware would be expected to process movie stimuli similarly to healthy controls, while
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patients who are minimally conscious may experience more difficulties, lowering their
overall ISCs with controls.
A second notable finding comes from the patient ISCs during the scrambled conditions;
the two patients who were significantly synchronized with the control group during the
scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead” were not synchronized with the control group
during the intact condition. A possible explanation for these results is that the two
patients who were synchronized with controls during the scrambled version retained
some cognitive or attentional resources and were minimally engaged while it played. This
is possible because the scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead” contained some
residual structure. However, the neural activity from these patients was not significantly
synchronized during in the intact version of the movie, perhaps due to fatigue (the intact
movie was presented after the scrambled version), or disinterest. This itself is not
unusual; even among the healthy control group, one participant whose EEG was
synchronized with the rest of the control group during the scrambled version of the movie
was not significantly synchronized during the intact version. Such findings speak to the
inherent variability associated with measures designed to assess individual cases. This
provides added motivation for evaluating the reliability of this method for determining
residual cognitive processing in the patients with DOC, ideally by conducting
longitudinal studies whereby repeated measures are taken.
Overall, 38% of patients tested were significantly synchronized with healthy controls
during either “Bang! You’re Dead” or “Taken”. However, among these patients, only one
(Patient 10, see Table 1) showed significant ISCs with controls during both movies (of
the nine who were tested with both). While significant synchronization during both
movies provides the strongest evidence of residual processing, inconsistencies in ISCs
between movie types for most patients underscores the need for a holistic testing
approach that employs multiple tasks to identify covert cognitive processing in this
population (Engemann et al., 2018; Gibson et al., 2014; Kirschner et al., 2015; Sitt et al.,
2014). Individual patients with DOC likely have marked differences in sensory and
cognitive function, and brain-based assessments should be designed with this in mind.
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The results of this study set the stage for developing sensitive and reliable brain-based
assessments of covert cognitive processing and, potentially, awareness in patients with
DOC—ideally, ones that can be administered easily in clinical settings. The paradigm
presented here moves one step closer to achieving this goal. By developing a bedside
EEG movie task (Naci et al., 2014, 2015), we were able to quantify a neural index of
cognitive processing while simultaneously minimizing the physical burden to patients
incurred during fMRI testing. Likewise, the majority of EEG tasks used to assess
cognitive function and awareness in DOC patients to date have done so by examining
changes in neural activity that are either elicited automatically (e.g., event-related
potentials; Kotchoubey et al., 2005) or depend upon active responding (Cruse et al.,
2011, 2012). In both contexts, these paradigms are often contrived or unnatural, making
an already difficult task even more challenging. Furthermore, the event-related
approaches routinely used for clinical neurological assessments require hundreds of trials
to open a brief window into the sensory and cognitive function of DOC patients; whereas
our method was specifically developed to work with a single sample of continuous EEG,
recorded during a short naturalistic movie task, to assess covert cognition in individual
patients with DOC.
For any task to be included in the standard clinical assessment repertoire, it must be rapid
and allow for individual assessments of cognition at the bedside without the need for
complex tasks or instructions. Our paradigm meets all of those requirements. Taking cues
from continuous clinical monitoring and brain-computer interfaces (Abdalmalak et al.,
2017; Chatelle et al., 2012; Laureys et al., 2005; Naci et al., 2012), the future of the
CorrCA method could allow for examination of moment-to-moment ISCs between DOC
patients and controls during movie tasks, further supplementing behavioural measures of
awareness at the bedside.
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Chapter 3

3

A comparison of English and French naturalistic
listening paradigms for the assessment of
consciousness in unresponsive individuals

This chapter has been published elsewhere (citation below) and is reproduced here with
permission from the publisher, IEEE SMC Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society. ©
2020 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from:

Laforge, G., Incio Serra, N., Blain-Moraes, S., Stojanoski, B., & Owen, A. M. (2020). A
Comparison of English and French Naturalistic Listening Paradigms for the Assessment
of Consciousness in Unresponsive Individuals. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics: Systems, 2020-Octob, 526–533.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9283263

3.1 Introduction
Severe brain injury is a medical emergency requiring immediate hospitalization and
critical care intervention. Fortunately, continued advancements in intensive medicine
have improved the likelihood of survival from serious brain injury, but recovery in the
short and long term remain difficult to predict. Patients in critical care will routinely
undergo a battery of behavioural assessments and continuous neurological monitoring to
establish baseline levels of reactivity and neuronal function. However, preserved
awareness in the acute stages of severe brain injury is challenging to infer from standard
clinical measures alone. Specialized neural assessments that use advanced neuroimaging
technologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
electroencephalography (EEG) may provide deeper insights into the cognitive state of
patients with acute brain injury, which may have significant implications for medical
management and prognostication (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993). In fact,
recent developments in the study of disorders of consciousness (DoC) suggest that
advanced neural assessments may be crucial in this regard (Owen, 2013)
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DoC are a classification of neurological disorders that can result from serious brain
injury. After recovery from coma, DoC present as a state of apparent wakefulness with
impaired conscious awareness (Bernat, 2006; Laureys et al., 2004; Owen, 2008) and are
diagnosed using behavioural measures like the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R;
Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). Patients who remain awake, but behaviourally non-responsive
during CRS-R assessment meet the clinical criteria for the vegetative state (also known as
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; UWS), and are presumed to be entirely unaware;
that is, unaware of who they are, where they are and the predicament they are in. In
contrast, patients who exhibit inconsistent but reproducible evidence of awareness are
typically diagnosed as being in a “minimally conscious state”. However, a lack of
consistent responding during behavioural assessment could be indicative of any number
of cognitive or motor impairments that are unrelated to a patient’s conscious state—the
latter of which is evidenced by patients diagnosed with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS) who
remain fully aware but largely unable to speak or move (Laureys et al., 2005). As such,
over a decade ago, researchers began to investigate the utility of using neuroimaging as a
more sensitive means of assessing awareness in DoC.
In 2006, Owen et al.(Owen et al., 2006) first reported unequivocal evidence that some
patients with DoC are, in fact, entirely aware. In that study, Owen et al. (Owen et al.,
2006) used fMRI and two mental imagery paradigms to assess “covert” commandfollowing—responding through neural activity rather than behaviour—in one patient who
was, by all clinical accounts, in a vegetative state. They found clear, consistent, and
sustained activation in regions of the brain associated with each imagery condition that
were statistically indistinguishable from those observed in healthy controls. These
findings were later replicated in a larger cohort of patients with DoC (Monti et al., 2010),
while multiple similar neuroimaging tasks have since been developed to index awareness,
as well as different dimensions of residual cognition using fMRI and EEG (Cruse et al.,
2011; Naci et al., 2014).
More recent years have seen a shift away from “active” task-based approaches to
assessing awareness in DoC, and towards more naturalistic paradigms that approximate
real-world contexts, like watching movies or listening to stories. Movie-watching, in
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particular, has emerged as a rapid and more ecologically-valid approach to assessing
awareness in DoC patients. The multi-dimensional nature of movies, in that they contain
visual information, sound, speech, and most importantly, a narrative, makes them ideal
for assessing cognitive function and covert awareness. For example, a study by Naci et al.
(Naci et al., 2014) leveraged a phenomenon called inter-subject neural synchronization to
assess higher-order “executive” processing in patients with DoC. When individuals watch
the same movie in an fMRI scanner (or while wearing a functional near-infrared
spectroscopy cap; Liu et al., 2017), their brains tend to “synchronize”, that is, voxel-wise
activity across participants becomes highly correlated (Hasson et al., 2004). This effect is
particularly pronounced when the movies are highly engaging or suspenseful. Naci et al.
(Naci et al., 2014) capitalized on this neural synchronization and designed an fMRI
paradigm to assess the degree to which patients with DoC synchronized to healthy
controls during a short, suspenseful Alfred Hitchcock movie called “Bang! You’re
Dead”. They observed significant brain-wide synchronization among controls, including
in frontoparietal regions that are responsible for higher-order executive functions such as
attention, working memory and theory of mind (Ptak, 2012; Wolinski et al., 2018;
Yeshurun et al., 2017). Moreover, they found that synchronization between participants
in these frontal and parietal areas correlated with independent subjective and objective
ratings of suspense during the movie, acquired from separate groups of participants tested
outside the scanner. When they tested two patients with DoC using this paradigm, they
found that the frontoparietal activity in one patient was significantly correlated with the
healthy group, providing strong evidence that they were processing the higher-order
elements of the movie, like its plot. On this basis, the authors concluded that the patient
was consciously aware (Naci et al., 2014), and this was later independently verified using
alternate neuroimaging approaches.
While considerable progress has been made in developing reliable neural assessments of
awareness and cognitive function in DoC, the use of these paradigms to assess covert
awareness in acutely brain-injured patients has only just begun to be explored (Claassen,
et al., 2019; Edlow et al., 2017). In this study, we developed an EEG protocol to index
inter-subject neural synchronization (inter-subject correlations, ISCs) among healthy
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controls during an auditory movie task (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016)
Compared to fMRI, EEG is low-cost and portable, which makes it ideally suited for
bedside assessment of patients in critical care. Additionally, to maximize the applicability
of this protocol in the Canadian context, we compared two versions of the same audio
clip, one English and one French, to determine whether this task could be used in both
English and French-speaking individuals and, if so, to establish baseline measures of
ISCs from healthy controls in both languages. To accomplish this, we tested three main
hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that the “Taken” stimuli would produce significant
ISCs between participants, irrespective of language and that we could detect this using
EEG (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016). Second, we predicted that the narrative
of “Taken” would recruit areas of the frontoparietal “executive” network, resulting in
higher ISCs across groups compared to a scrambled control version of the same audio
(Naci et al., 2014, 2015). Third, we hypothesized that if neural synchronization is driven
in large part by the plot of “Taken”—which unfolds the same way in both English and
French—the ISCs would correlate over time between the two languages. This would
provide strong evidence, not only that the same executive processes are involved in
English and French narrative processing, but that these measures are indexing brain
processes that are specifically related to plot-following, rather than some other (e.g.
sensory) properties of the narrative stream (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Naci et al., 2014,
2015).

3.2 Methods
3.2.1

Participants

Ethics approval for this study was granted by the institutional research ethics boards at
the University of Western Ontario and McGill University (Appendix A). Thirty-four
participants were enrolled in this study: we recruited twenty participants from the Brain
and Mind Institute at the University of Western Ontario—eighteen English-speakers and
two English-French bilinguals—and fourteen participants from a research subject pool at
McGill University. Eighteen native English-speaking participants listened to the English
versions of the stimuli, and sixteen native French-speaking participants listened to the
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French versions. All participants had self-reported normal hearing. Another 20
participants were recruited from the University of Western Ontario during an earlier
study to perform a behavioural suspense ratings task while listening to the intact English
version of “Taken”. Written informed consent was obtained prior to testing, and
participants were compensated for their time.

3.2.2

Stimuli and experimental procedures

For this study, we used English and French versions of a short (5 minute) suspenseful
auditory excerpt from the movie “Taken”. We chose to use auditory stimuli rather than an
audio-visual clip like “Bang! You’re Dead” to account for likely visual impairments in
many patients with acute brain injury. The content of this clip has been described in detail
elsewhere (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2015). Briefly, it depicts a
tense phone conversation between a father and his daughter, who, with instructions from
her father, is attempting to hide from intruders in her accommodations. Like “Bang!
You’re Dead”, this clip is highly suspenseful and produces reliable frontoparietal
synchronization in healthy volunteers when tested with fMRI (Naci et al., 2015). Notably,
although the English and French versions of the clip depict the same overall narrative, the
timing with which events occur is not identical. In addition to any differences in speech
pacing between the two languages, the English version contains a nearly 10s delay early
on in the clip that occurs prior to the start of the conversation between the father and
daughter. In these 10s, listeners can hear the daughter’s phone ringing, but the sound is
being drowned out by her playing loud rock music. This scene is much shorter in the
French version of the clip. The 10s lag remains constant for the remainder of the English
clip. Nevertheless, the EEG activity was epoched at the same time points and
encapsulated the entire duration of the narrative for both English and French versions.
We also used “scrambled” versions of the two audio clips to serve as perceptual control
conditions in this study. The scrambled stimuli were generated using two techniques:
spectral rotation and temporally reversing the audio. The intact and scrambled English
versions of “Taken” were from an earlier study that had used spectral rotation to scramble
the audio. This scrambling procedure preserved the auditory properties of the stimuli but
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rendered the speech, and therefore the narrative, indecipherable (Naci et al., 2015). The
French-language clips were generated specifically for this study. Here, we scrambled the
audio by temporally reversing the intact version of “Taken” to investigate whether the
presence of speech sounds in scrambled stimuli affected ISCs (Lerner et al., 2011).
Although the scrambling techniques were different, both effectively removed the
narrative from the clip and allowed us to compare the neural activity associated with
auditory processing from that underlying plot-following specifically. Stimulus
presentation was controlled by the Psychtoolbox (Kleiner et al., 2007) plugin for
MATLAB running on a 15″ Apple MacBook Pro, and audio was presented binaurally
through Etymotics ER-1 in-ear headphones.
Participants were instructed to sit comfortably with their eyes open during the study and
asked to listen attentively to the stimuli. We then presented the scrambled version of
“Taken”, followed by the intact audio in either English or French depending on the
participants’ spoken (native) language. This order of presentation was intended to
minimize potential carry-over effects from the narrative in one condition to that in the
subsequent condition. During the suspense ratings task, participants listened to the intact
English version of “Taken” and were asked to rate how much suspense they felt at 2s
intervals on a scale from 1 (least) to 10 (most). Responses were collected using a laptop
keyboard while participants listened to the clip.

3.2.3

EEG data collection and preprocessing

EEG data were acquired using a 129-electrode saline-electrolyte sensor net connected to
a Net Amps amplifier. Signals were sampled at 250Hz and referenced online to the vertex
(Cz). Electrode impedances were kept below 50kΩ for the duration of the experiment.
Offline preprocessing was performed using MATLAB software, custom scripts, and the
EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The EEG data were re-referenced offline
to the common average and bandpass filtered from 0.5 - 60Hz, with a notch at 60Hz to
remove line noise. We used a custom automatic artifact detection pipeline to identify bad
channels, which we removed, then interpolated back into the data. Independent
components analysis (ICA) was also used to identify patterns of EEG activity
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characteristic of eye and muscle movement. The ICA components were visually
inspected, and those capturing artifacts were manually removed from the data. Finally,
preprocessed EEG signals were de-spiked to reduce the influence of deviant peak
amplitudes on later analyses (Dmochowski et al., 2012). EEG preprocessing was
performed separately for each participant and condition.

3.2.4

Data analysis

We used a correlated components analysis (CorrCA) to identify patterns of EEG activity
that were common across all participants during the tasks. CorrCA is a variant of a
principal components analysis (PCA) that calculates the spatial weights of voltage
activity across the scalp such that the activity is maximally correlated between subjects.
The weightings are then used to extract discrete patterns of neural activity, or
components, from the EEG that are highly correlated between subjects. Like PCA,
CorrCA computes an eigenvalue decomposition of covariance data. However, CorrCA
uses the pooled within-subject cross-covariance
Rw =

1
𝑁

∑𝑁
𝑘=1 Rkk,

and pooled between-subjects cross-covariance
1

𝑁
Rb = 𝑁(𝑁−1) ∑𝑁
𝑘=1 ∑𝑙=1,𝑙≠𝑘 Rkl

where
Rkl = ∑𝑡 (xk (t) - x̄k) (xl(t) - x̄l)T
calculates the cross-covariance between participant k and participant l across all
electrodes x at time t as the source of its covariance. The eigenvectors wi of the crosscovariance matrix Rw-1Rb, with the largest eigenvalues λi calculated as (Rw-1Rb)wi = λiwi
are the components that maximize Pearson’s correlation between subjects in the data. The
resulting N – 1 components, where N is the total number of sources—electrodes in this
case—are then ranked-ordered by the overall strength of their correlations between
subjects (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016). The spatial weights and time courses
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of these components, therefore, represent common patterns of neural activity across
participants. We performed the CorrCA separately for each audio condition, and only the
top-ranked components were used for later analyses.

3.2.5

Inter-subject correlations

To calculate ISCs, we first back-projected the component vectors wi onto the EEG data
from each participant. The back-projection created a spatial filter of the data, which
isolated the time course of component activity for each subject. We then correlated these
component time courses (using Pearson’s rho) between participants and calculated the
average correlation between each subject and the rest of the group. These average
correlations represented the individual subject ISCs. Finally, t-contrasts were performed
on the mean ISCs across the groups to compare the degree of synchronization between
stimulus conditions.
Although this approach captured the overall degree of inter-subject neural
synchronization during the “Taken” task, it collapses across a crucial dimension of the
narrative: its plot. One of the unique aspects of naturalistic stimuli like movies is that the
plot unfolds over time, and plot elements like tension or suspense build gradually rather
than being constant. In this sense, ISCs computed across the entire duration of the stimuli
likely dampen the neural activity associated with plot-following over time. To this end,
we capitalized on the temporal resolution of EEG and calculated ISCs in a time-resolved
fashion using a sliding-window technique. Temporal inter-subject correlations (tISCs)
were computed as the mean ISCs across participants within a 5s window with 3s of
overlap. This resulted in new ISCs at 2s time intervals for the duration of the audio,
which aligns with the repetition time (TR) of earlier studies investigating ISCs with fMRI
(Naci et al., 2014, 2015). Statistical significance of the tISCs at each 2s time point was
tested using permutation statistics. This approach involved shifting the phase of the
correlations and using a 1000 iteration resampling procedure to generate null
distributions of ISCs at each time point, with the top 5% of values representing the
significance threshold (FDR corrected). A Chi-squared test of proportion was calculated
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to compare the number of time windows with significant ISCs between the intact and
scrambled audio conditions
We also explored the 10s difference between the tISCs of the English and French
versions of “Taken” using a cross-correlation analysis. We predicted that the offset of the
narratives would likely have influenced the temporal structure of the tISCs time course
and, therefore, the comparison between languages. The cross-correlation procedure
iteratively shifted the tISCs for each condition to different time lags (5 lags in each
direction, reflecting 10s shift in each direction) and allowed us to investigate the effect of
the narrative offset between languages on the tISCs.
Finally, Pearson’s correlations were calculated between the tISCs for each condition and
subjective ratings of suspense for the English version of “Taken” that were previously
collected from an independent sample (N = 20). Here, participants were asked to rate how
much “suspense” they felt on a scale from 1 - 10 (least to most) at 2s intervals during the
intact version of “Taken”. The mean suspense ratings were then calculated for each time
point and Z-normalized to generate an averaged “suspensefulness” time course. Despite
only being collected for the English version of “Taken”, we predicted that the suspense
ratings—which captured elements of the narrative beyond its purely linguistic
properties—would correlate with the time course of ISCs for both English and French
groups.

3.3 Results
3.3.1

Comparable inter-subject correlations across stimulus
languages

The EEG data from three participants in the English group and five in the French group
were excluded for excessive or systematic noise contamination. All further analyses were
performed on 15 and 11 participants in the English and French groups, respectively. We
first calculated the CorrCA on the intact and scrambled audio from the English language
conditions. The component topographies (Figure 1a,c) bore some spatial similarities, with
a clear anterior-posterior divide, but the overall voltage maps differed considerably
between conditions. We then calculated the ISCs between the component time courses

81

for all participants for the intact and scrambled audio conditions. In line with our first
hypothesis, we found that both the intact (M = 0.015, SD = 0.006) and the scrambled (M
= 0.012, SD = 0.006) audio conditions produced significant ISCs at the group level, tIntact
(14) = 9.60 , p = 1.788e-07, tScrambled(14) = 7.22, p = 4.47e-06, relative to the null
hypothesis that no synchronization occurred during these conditions. When we compared
the average ISCs between the intact and scrambled conditions, we found significantly
higher ISCs for the intact condition, tIntact-Scrambled(14) = 2.24, p = 0.042.
We then calculated the CorrCA and ISCs for the intact and scrambled French versions of
“Taken”. The component topographies for the French audio conditions were largely
dissimilar to those observed for the English language condition (Figure 1b,d) but the
magnitude of the intact (M = 0.019, SD = 0.007) and scrambled (M = 0.019, SD = 0.008)
versions were comparable. Likewise, both conditions produced significant ISCs across
the group, tintact (10) = 8.93, p = 4.411e-06, tscrambled(10) = 8.26, p = 8.88e-06. However,
unlike the English condition, the intact and scrambled ISCs were not significantly
different in the French group, tintact-scrembled(10) = -0.28, p = 0.78. In fact, both the intact
and scrambled versions of the French audio produced significantly higher ISCs than the
scrambled English condition, tFrenchIntact-EnglishScrambled(24) = 2.74, p = 0.011; tFrenchScrambledEnglishScrambled(24)

3.3.2

= 2.85, p = 0.009.

Temporal inter-subject correlations reveal strong effect of
plot

The ISCs demonstrated that each of the stimulus conditions produced significant
synchronization across the group, but the effect of the plot was inconsistent between
languages. We investigated the temporal dynamics of inter-subject synchronization using
tISCs calculated at 2s time intervals throughout each audio condition. During the intact
English version of “Taken”, the tISCs reached significance for 21.71% of the audio,
compared to only 6.58% during the scrambled version. Similarly, significant tISCs
occurred more frequently for the intact French version of “Taken, occurring for 28.95%
of the audio, compared to the scrambled French condition where significant tISCs were
observed for only 9.21% of the audio (Figure 2a-d). The frequency of the tISCs for both
languages was significantly higher during the intact audio condition compared to their
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respective scrambled conditions, χ2English(1, N = 152) = 8.92, p = 0.003, χ2French(1, N =
152) = 11.68, p = 6.327e-04, which suggested that the narrative was a significant factor
driving inter-subject synchronization (rather than, say, the basic sensory properties of the
intact and scrambled stimuli which were matched). We did not find any differences
between the frequency of significant tISCs within conditions (i.e., intact to intact,
scrambled to scrambled) between languages.

Figure 4. Component topographies and individual ISCs for the intact (top) and
scrambled (bottom) versions of “Taken” across languages.
Group-level mean ISCs were comparable across the intact English (M = 0.015, SD =
0.006; A) and French (M = 0.019, SD = 0.007; B) audio conditions and both were
significantly higher than the mean ISCs for the scrambled English version of “Taken” (M
= 0.012, SD = 0.006; C). Interestingly, the mean ISCs for the scrambled French version
of “Taken” (M = 0.019, SD = 0.008; D) did not differ significantly from the intact audio
conditions.
We then directly compared the time courses of the tISCs between each audio condition.
Despite having similar frequencies of significant synchronization, the tISCs between the
intact English and French audio were not significantly correlated rEnglish-French(24), = 0.05,
p = 0.534, nor were the tISCs between either language or audio condition. Additionally,
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we compared the tISCs for the English and French versions of “Taken” to its suspense
ratings. We found that the tISCs for the intact English audio were significantly correlated
to the suspense ratings for “Taken”, rIntactEnglish(33) = 0.23, p = 0.005. but the correlation
between the intact French tISCs and suspense only approached significance,
rIntactFrench(29) = 0.141, p = 0.09. Neither of the scrambled tISCs were significantly
correlated with the suspense ratings.
Overall, these results provided strong support for our second hypothesis that the ISCs
were driven in large part by the narrative of “Taken”; the quantitative comparison of the
significant tISCs over time suggested that participants were synchronized significantly
more often throughout the intact audio conditions compared to the scrambled. This was
further underscored by our finding that the tISCs from the English version of “Taken”
were more highly correlated with the suspense ratings (acquired using the same English
version) than were the tISCs from the French version. From the results presented here, we
concluded that both the English and French narratives of “Taken” systematically
recruited additional executive areas of the brain across participants(Hasson et al., 2004;
Naci et al., 2014, 2015), and that these were closely associated with following its plot.
This resulted in significant tISCs more frequently than in the scrambled versions.

3.3.3

Re-alignment of temporal inter-subject correlations accounts
for narrative offset

The correlation between the intact English and French tISCs was unexpectedly low,
given their comparable degree of overall synchronization (ISCs; Figure 1) and over time
(tISCs; Figure 2). However, the 10s offset between the English and French narratives
may have differentially affected the temporal properties of the tISCs, resulting in a lag
between time courses. We explored this possibility using a cross-correlation analysis,
which iteratively computed the correlations between tISCs at different time lags (5 lags
of 2s in each direction). This approach revealed a peak correlation between the intact
English and French tISCs at a 6s time lag. We adjusted for this shift by removing the first
three time points of the English tISCs (to remove the lag) and the last three of the French
tISCs (equalize lengths). Recomputing Pearson’s correlation with this shift revealed a
significant correlation between the intact English and French tISCs, rEnglish-French(24) =
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0.23, p = 0.005, as predicted by our third hypothesis (Figure 2e, f). No further
correlations reached significance after adjusting for this time lag. The lag in the English
audio occurs very early on (within the first 40s) and only contains an extended segment
of music. Rather than affecting any of its intrinsic qualities, this lag simply delayed the
unfolding of the narrative. Indeed, after accounting for the differences between the
stimuli, we found a significant correlation between the intact English and French tISCs,
which suggested that both versions captured similar neural processes related to plotfollowing.
However, it was not clear why a shift of 6s, rather than the full 10s, produced the
maximal correlation. One possibility is that the resolution of the sliding window we used
to compute the tISCs may have suppressed some of the early effects of the offset
(Dehghani et al., 2019). Using a 5s sliding window with 3s of overlap, we calculated the
tISCs at 2s time intervals throughout the audio. As such, the tISCs that occurred soon
after the delay began likely contained some mixture of signals from before the delay and
during, which may have washed-out its early effects. In fact, the cross-correlation
analysis suggested that this was likely the case, as it revealed a sharp ramp-up of the
correlation between the intact English and intact French tISCs just before the 6s shift and
a gradual reduction just after. We reported only the correlation at the 6s shift because it
most clearly illustrated the relationship between the English and French tISCs.
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Figure 5. Time points (2s) with significant group-level tISCs (blue) for the intact (top)
and scrambled (bottom) versions of “Taken” across languages.
The number of time windows with significant tISCs during the intact English (21.71%; A)
and the French audio condition (28.95%; B) were significantly more frequent than the
scrambled conditions in either English (6.58%; C) or French (9.21%; D). Bottom panels
show the overlap in time-shifted tISCs for the intact (E) and scrambled (F) English (blue)
and French (red) audio conditions.

3.4 Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we developed a neural assessment protocol to index covert awareness in
patients with severe brain injury using EEG and a naturalistic listening task. To
accomplish this, we investigated whether ISCs in EEG activity could reliably index plotfollowing in healthy controls during French and English versions of “Taken”. The results
presented here provide compelling support for this approach.
Overall, our findings were consistent with those reported in previous studies on moviewatching in fMRI (Naci et al., 2014, 2015) and EEG (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al.,
2016). During movie-watching tasks, inter-subject neural synchronization reflects the
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shared patterns of neural activity across people that are involved in processing both the
sensory properties of the movie, as well as higher-order elements like its plot. As such,
we expected to find significant inter-subject synchronization across our groups during
each of the audio conditions. We also predicted that the added effect of the ‘coherent’
narrative would result in significantly higher overall ISCs for the intact conditions when
compared to the scrambled conditions. While the ISCs for the intact English version of
“Taken” were significantly higher than its scrambled counterpart, the ISCs for the French
audio conditions were nearly identical. The most likely explanation for this difference
lies in the ways the two language versions of the narrative were scrambled. The English
audio was scrambled using spectral rotation, which retained many of the auditory
properties of “Taken” but effectively removed any speech sounds from the clip. The
scrambled version of the French audio was simply the intact version played backwards,
which preserved all of its acoustic features but reversed the temporal structure of the plot.
In this way, reversing the audio was a more ecological approach (Lerner et al., 2011), but
this may have resulted in increased ISCs related to aspects of the preserved speech
sounds. It is possible, for instance, that participants listening to the French version may
have been able to glean some information about the overall nature of the plot from tonal
changes in the voices (e.g., whispers, yelling), that were obscured in the spectrally rotated
English scrambled version. In this case, participants may have synchronized to some
degree through making similar predictions about the content of the narrative from its
speech sounds or overall thematic qualities (e.g., its intensity, emotional valence). Still,
the effects of the “Taken” audio on inter-subject synchronization in this study were clear
across conditions. While the scrambling methods had a differential effect on the
magnitude of ISCs between languages in our healthy group, this does not undermine the
utility of this protocol in patients; both the English and French versions of “Taken”
reliably produced comparable ISCs between groups which, as our later analyses
suggested, captured similar processes related to plot-following (Naci et al., 2014, 2015).
The effect of the narrative, however, was much clearer when comparing the tISCs
between the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken”. In both English and French,
participants became synchronized significantly more often while listening to the intact,
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rather than the scrambled audio. This finding highlighted the importance of accounting
for the moment-to-moment fluctuations in synchronization as a narrative evolves over
time. The tISCs also allowed us to directly compare the time course of synchronization
between audio conditions and, importantly, to the suspense ratings for “Taken” acquired
from an entirely different group of participants. Although we did not find any significant
correlations between the tISCs across conditions, the tISCs for the intact English audio
were significantly correlated with the suspense ratings, which provided additional
evidence that the tISCs captured the neural activity specifically associated with following
the plot of “Taken”. Likewise, the correlation between the suspense ratings and the tISCs
for the intact French audio trended towards significance but unsurprisingly was not as
strong as that of the correlation between English versions. Nevertheless, these combined
results suggested that the higher-order processes involved in narrative processing like
theory of mind, working memory, and attention (Ptak, 2012; Wolinski et al., 2018;
Yeshurun et al., 2017) transcend linguistic contexts, which points towards a common
mode of executive processing across languages (Naci et al., 2014, 2015). While some
evidence of this been previously reported in fMRI (Honey et al., 2012; Yeshurun et al.,
2017), to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to demonstrate this effect using
EEG.
The time-shifted correlations between the intact English and French tISCs warrant further
discussion. We found a 10s difference between the two audio clips, which we predicted
would have an effect on the temporal alignment of the ISCs between languages . This
was indeed the case; when we compared the time course of the tISCs for the intact audio
conditions, we found that they were not significantly correlated, despite capturing the
same narrative over the same time scale and producing similar degrees and frequencies of
inter-subject synchronization. Although this will not affect the implementation of this
protocol in critical care centres, it was important to determine whether the tISCs for each
language indexed similar neural processes. To explore this, we used a cross-correlation to
compute the r-values at different time lags. This approach revealed a significant maximal
correlation at a 6s shift in the English audio, which roughly corresponded to the offset of
the narrative between clips. Although this technique was somewhat unorthodox, we
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contend that if the tISCs between the intact English and French versions of “Taken” were
completely unrelated, that is, if they did not capture the same neural processes associated
with plot-following, the shift would not have affected the correlation between the two.
However, this was not what we found; the shift in the English tISCs was precisely what
we would have predicted given its 10s delay at the beginning of the clip and adjusting for
this delay revealed a strong correlation between the tISCs in both languages for the intact
audio. In a sense, this provided even stronger evidence that the CorrCA of the English
and French versions of “Taken” captured similar neural processes because we found a
strong relationship between the tISCs, despite the different linguistic properties of the
stimuli as well as the asymmetrical timing of the clips. From these results, we can
conclude that our EEG movie paradigm indexes similar aspects of plot-following and,
therefore, conscious processing, in both English and French.
Our EEG assessment protocol has considerable potential as a novel brain-computer
interface for detecting conscious processing in unresponsive individuals. Moreover, the
testing procedures and analyses presented here could remain largely unchanged to assess
awareness in patients in intensive care. First, rather than recalculate the CorrCA with the
patient data, the existing component topography for the intact or scrambled version of
“Taken” could be back-projected onto the patient EEG. This would effectively isolate the
same pattern of activity and, in doing so, generate a new time course of component
activity for each patient. As in healthy controls, this component time course could then be
correlated with the healthy control group to produce the ISCs for individual patients,
which could then be compared to a baseline of healthy control ISCs. The tISCs analysis,
likewise, could be modified to determine when patients are significantly synchronized to
the healthy group during “Taken”. This would involve iteratively calculating the ISCs
between individual patients and healthy controls at each time point to generate a time
course of tISCs. The time course of tISCs for patients could then be directly contrasted
with the tISCs of a healthy control group or to the suspense ratings for “Taken”.
Significant correlations between patients and controls, therefore, would suggest that they
are processing the narrative of the clip in a way that is similar to healthy controls, which
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could help inform future medical management and prognosis (Andrews et al., 1996;
Childs et al., 1993).
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Chapter 4

4

Identifying neural markers of naturalistic processing in
patients with severe acute brain injury: A multi-method
EEG approach

4.1 Introduction
Providing critical care for patients with severe acute brain injury is immensely
challenging; rapid clinical assessments and intensive therapies are crucial during the
initial hours and days after ICU admission, but uncertainties surrounding a patient’s
mental state, as well as their likelihood of recovery, are numerous. However, while
patient survival is paramount, prognostication of outcome plays a significant role in
guiding the course of treatment. Factors like the type and severity of brain injury (e.g.,
traumatic, anoxic), behavioural responsiveness, and the length of time between injury and
admission are all considered when planning how and, crucially, whether to continue
treatment (Canabal Berlanga, 2020; González-Robledo et al., 2015; Joosse et al., 2009;
Kulesza et al., 2015). Based on these metrics, poor prognosis may beget withdrawal of
life-sustaining therapies (WLST) and the transition to end-of-life care (Connolly et al.,
2016). A recent study found that of the 20% of all patients who die in the ICU, 60%
resulted from withdrawing active treatment (Braganza et al., 2017). Therefore, it is
critical that prognoses of survival and recovery—both of which inform the decision to
withdraw life-sustaining measures—are made in an objective and unbiased manner with
the best available tools and information.
However, significant variability exists between WLST practices across ICUs (Mark et al.,
2015; Prendergast et al., 1998). A systematic review of WLST practices in adult ICU
patients reported that the prevalence of patient mortality from WLST ranged from 0% to
84.1% across ICUs (Mark et al., 2015). What’s more, these practices varied substantially
by region of the world, country, ICU, and even within an individual critical care center
(Mark et al., 2015). Although legal differences in WLST practices globally, cultural
traditions, and patient demographics could explain much of this variability (Barnato et
al., 2012; Bosshard et al., 2008; Mark et al., 2015; Muni et al., 2011), physician opinion
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and hospital-specific guidelines surrounding WLST play a significant role (Curtis &
Barnato, 2014; Garland & Connors, 2007; Lee et al., 2020). Indeed, Garland and Connors
(2007) reported that decisions to withdraw WLST were more strongly related to the
identity of the attending physician than to patients’ acute diagnosis, presenting illness or
injury, or comorbid conditions. Although these data are not specific to patients with
serious brain injury, this trend raises significant concerns about the subjective nature in
which prognosis (i.e., from standard clinical assessments) and decisions to WLST are
made in critical care settings. One way to minimize prognostic variability—and
variability in WLST practices generally—between health practitioners and ICU sites is to
develop objective and quantifiable markers of brain function of patients in critical care.
While many measures exist to assess patients with acute brain injury, predicting outcome
using standard clinical tools remains a significant challenge (Duclos et al., 2020).
Routine clinical assessments are a key part of standard of care for patients with serious
brain injury. These frequently include structural imaging (e.g., computerized tomography
[CT], MRI), neurological exams (e.g., cranial nerve function, reflexes), and behavioural
measures of responsivity like the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976).
Although many of these assessments have been standardized and yield clinically
meaningful information about a patient’s physical and mental state, their coarse,
subjective, and largely behavioural nature limits their prognostic utility. As an example,
somatosensory-evoked potentials (SSEPs)—an electrophysiological response to electrical
stimulation of the median nerve—predict poor outcome in comatose patients with a high
degree of accuracy; patients who do not produce SSEPs in response to nerve stimulation
rarely show clinically meaningful improvements and their condition is likely to
deteriorate over time. However, the presence of an SSEP response does not predict
quality of outcome in coma—including those resulting from serious brain injury—
survivors (Glimmerveen et al., 2020; Kane et al., 2017; Rossetti, 2017). Likewise,
standardized neurological assessments like the GCS (Teasdale & Jennett, 1976) have
many of the same limitations as the CRS-R (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005); both rely entirely
on observable behaviour and involve subjective interpretations of, often subtle, responses
(Coleman et al., 2009; 2009; Gibson et al., 2014; Owen, 2008, 2013). In this way,
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functional neuroimaging could provide valuable insight into the neural and cognitive
function of acutely comatose brain-injured patients, further informing outcome prediction
to improve accuracy of prognosis (Duclos et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et al., 2020).
Assessments of covert awareness and residual cognition that use functional neuroimaging
have had an immense impact on the management and treatment of patients with chronic
DOC (Kondziella et al., 2016; Owen, 2008, 2013). So immense, in fact, that the
American Academy of Neurology recently updated its practice guidelines for patients
with DOC to recommend functional neuroimaging in cases where behavioural evidence
of awareness is lacking (Giacino et al., 2018). Given the success of neuroimaging in
chronic DOC, it is likely that techniques like fMRI and EEG will provide deeper insight
into the neurological factors that predict recovery of patients with acute DOC, in
particular, acute coma. Acute coma is defined by a complete absence of wakefulness and
awareness; comatose patients do not open their eyes and remain entirely behaviourally
non-responsive (Laureys et al., 2009; Owen, 2008). Fortunately, coma is most often a
temporary state lasting days or weeks. During this period, patients may die, recover
partially or completely (though sometimes with Locked-in Syndrome), or transition into a
chronic DOC such as a vegetative or minimally conscious state (Bernat, 2006; Laureys et
al., 2004, 2005). Early detection of patients who will most likely survive or develop a
chronic DOC would improve prognostic accuracy and, potentially, direct the course of
treatment in ICU.
In recent years, the neuroscience of DOC has begun to focus on patients rendered
comatose from acute severe brain injury. Indeed, taking cues from the chronic DOC
literature, many studies have employed established techniques to assess acute DOC
patients. These include investigations of resting-state BOLD and EEG activity to predict
outcome (Pauli et al., 2020), neural examinations of sensory processing and speech
detection (Chatelle et al., 2020; Sokoliuk et al., 2021), as well as covert commandfollowing ability (Claassen et al., 2019; Edlow et al., 2017). Many studies have also
incorporated machine learning algorithms into their outcome modelling to extract hidden
features in BOLD or EEG activity that are associated with recovery (Chatelle et al., 2020;
Claassen et al., 2019; Edlow et al., 2017).
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During rest, preserved BOLD connectivity in the default mode network is predictive of
better outcomes in patients with acute brain injury (Kondziella et al., 2017; Sair et al.,
2018; Threlkeld et al., 2018). Additionally, quantitative analysis of relative EEG Alpha
power and its variability improved prognostication of outcome in coma patients relative
to standard clinical measures (O’Donnell et al., 2021). Multiple studies have also
reported that early evidence of language processing and neural command-following (e.g.,
when patients are prompted to “Imagine moving your right hand”) are associated with
better outcomes at 3 and 6 months (Chatelle et al., 2020; Claassen et al., 2019; Edlow et
al., 2017; Sokoliuk et al., 2021).
While these findings support the use of functional neuroimaging to improve outcome
prediction in acute coma, these approaches share many of the same limitations as in
chronic DOC. For instance, fMRI is not an ideal imaging modality for DOC patients, as
concerns regarding medical suitability and the risks incurred during transport to the fMRI
suite are amplified in patients receiving critical care (Cruse et al., 2011; Laforge,
Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020). Moreover, active task-based approaches, and those requiring
multiple conditions and trials, may identify only the small number of patients who can
respond consistently to task instructions and remain alert throughout long testing
sessions. The “Taken” audio paradigm presented in Chapter 2 and 3, is less affected by
these limitations and, for this reason, may serve as a novel tool to predict outcome after
severe acute brain injury (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et
al., 2020).
In this study, we administered the EEG “Taken” task to a small cohort (N = 5) of acutely
comatose patients admitted to the ICU (≤ 7d) for severe traumatic or non-traumatic brain
injury. Of note, unlike patients with chronic DOC, patients in acute coma often receive
continuous pharmacological sedation to minimize pain and discomfort and stabilize vital
physiological processes. Sedation is routinely paused, however, to perform neurological
assessments and track recovery of function. As such, we presented the intact and
scrambled versions of “Taken” to patients while they were on sedation and again after
sedation was paused. In doing so, we aimed to determine whether early evidence of
sensory and higher-order naturalistic processing, or the change in neural activity between
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levels of sedation, have prognostic utility in patients with severe acute brain injury. We
hypothesized that patients who recover would have retrospectively produced EEG
markers of sensory and cognitive processes (e.g., plot-following) during the “Taken”
task. Moreover, we hypothesized that changes in EEG activity between levels of
sedation—indicative of a recovery of consciousness—would also be associated with
outcome (Duclos et al., 2020). Specifically, we predicted that the magnitude of
differences in ISCs and in whole-brain functional connectivity would be associated with
recovery. Finally, we explored whether source-localized EEG activity from patients with
better outcomes would be more comparable to the pattern observed in healthy controls
during “Taken” than those with poor outcomes (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020;
Naci et al., 2015).

4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1

Patients and controls

Recruitment for this study took place between March 2020 and May 2021 at University
Hospital and Victoria Hospital in London, Canada. Patients were deemed eligible for this
study if they were over the age of 18, receiving treatment for severe primary (e.g.,
traumatic) or secondary (e.g., hypoxic) brain injury, admitted to ICU for 24hr-7d, and
receiving continuous pharmacological sedation. Patients were excluded from this study if
they had a history of open head injury, pre-existing cognitive impairments, or were
otherwise considered medically unsuitable by critical care staff. In total, we enrolled six
patients in this study (M age = 54.5, SD = 9.46) all of whom suffered hypoxic brain
injury prior to ICU admission. All patients completed our EEG assessment protocol
(Duclos et al., 2020), but one was excluded from further analysis due to excessive artifact
contamination of their EEG (final N = 5; see Table 2 for clinical demographic
information). For the healthy control sample, we used the EEG data from the participants
recruited for Chapter 2 (N = 15). Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Health
Sciences Research Ethics Board and the Non-Medical Research Ethics Board of The
University of Western Ontario (Appendix A).
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Table 2. Clinical and Demographic Information for Patients with Severe Acute Brain
Injury
Age at
Assessment
(years)
Patient
Patient
Patient
Patient
Patient

4.2.2

1
2
3
4
5

Sex

Interval
postinjury

Etiology

GCS
GCS
Significant Significant
Score on
Score off
ISC on
ISC off
Sedation
Sedation
Sedation
Sedation
(2T-15)
(2T-15)
68
Female
3d
CA
3T
3T
--40
Female
2d
STEMI
3T
10T
-Intact *
60
Female
2d
Stroke
6
6
--58
Female
5d
CA
3T
3T
-Intact *
55
Male
3d
CA
3T
3T
--Note. CA, cardiac arrest – patients tested post resuscitation; STEMI, ST-elevated
myocardial infarction; GCS, Glasgow Coma Scale; GSC score T, patient intubated. Intact *,
denotes significant ISC with controls during the intact version of “Taken”, p < 0.05; WLST,
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.

Recovery
(Y/N)

Y
WLST
N
Y
Y

Procedures

Prior to testing, our research team coordinated with bedside staff to schedule our EEG
assessment during planned withdrawals of pharmacological sedation. Per standard of care
for acutely comatose patients, critical care staff periodically wean or withdraw sedation
to perform neurological assessments like the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale and
Jennett, 1976). The GCS is a standardized measure used to categorize the severity of a
suspected head injury and identify impairments in conscious awareness. It contains three
subscales that score patients’ eye-opening, verbal, and motor responses to stimulation and
verbal commands. GCS scores range from 2T (no responses across any of the subscales)
to 15 (awake, aware, and fully responsive). Prior to withdrawal of sedation, our team
prepared the testing equipment, applied the EEG sensor net, and ensured electrode
impedances were below 50kΩ with minimal environmental noise contamination.
During the EEG assessment protocol, we presented the intact and scrambled clips from
the English version of “Taken” to patients while they were receiving continuous
pharmacological sedation and again after sedation was withdrawn (M = 33 min, SD = 11;
Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2015).
A member of our research team instructed patients to listen carefully to each clip and to
remain as still as possible until the end of the testing session. We presented the scrambled
version of the audio before the intact version for all patients to remove any potential
carryover effects of the narrative.
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Stimulus presentation was controlled using the Psychtoolbox plugin for MATLAB
(Kleiner et al., 2007) running on a 15’’ Apple MacBook Pro. The laptop screen remained
blank (black) during the recording session. We played the “Taken” audio through a pair
of Etymotics ER-1 in-ear headphones and adjusted the volume on a per-patient basis to
account for any ambient noise levels. All EEG data were preprocessed and analyzed
offline using MATLAB, EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), Brainstorm (Tadel et al.,
2011).

4.2.3

EEG acquisition

EEG data were collected using a 129-electrode saline electrolyte cap (Electrical
Geodesics Inc. [EGI], Oregon, USA) and the Netstation EEG acquisition software.
During testing, the EEG signals were sampled at 250Hz and referenced online to
electrode Cz. Our team ensured that electrode impedances were below 50kΩ before each
condition (i.e., scrambled and intact, on and off sedation). Offline EEG cleaning followed
standard preprocessing steps: we re-referenced the EEG to the common average,
bandpass filtered the data between 0.5 – 60Hz (notch filter applied at 60Hz) and removed
artifacts using a combination of automatic artifact detection and manual inspection.
Severely noise-contaminated channels were removed from the data and replaced with a
nearest-neighbour interpolation procedure. Finally, we performed ICA to remove artifact
components and de-spiked the data to minimize the influence of non-systematic peaks in
EEG amplitude on the analyses (Dmochowski et al., 2012). We performed all
preprocessing steps separately for each stimulus condition, level of sedation, and patient.

4.2.4

Overview of analytic procedures

We performed three separate analyses on the “Taken” EEG data to explore the features of
neural activity that may predict recovery of patients in an acute coma after serious brain
injury. First, we performed a CorrCA (Cohen & Parra, 2016; Dmochowski et al., 2012;
Ki et al., 2016; Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020) to determine whether the patterns of
neural activity exhibited by patients in the ICU during the intact and scrambled versions
of “Taken” are statistically similar to those of healthy controls. As in the study described
in Chapter 2, significant correlations in neural activity between patients and controls
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suggest comparable processing of the stimuli and, importantly, comparable processing of
its narrative. We predicted that significant correlations with controls during the task, or
significant differences in ISCs between conditions (intact, scrambled) and level of
sedation (on sedation, off sedation), would be associated with better recovery.
Second, we calculated inter-electrode magnitude-squared coherence to examine the
functional connectivity profiles of healthy controls and ICU patients during “Taken”.
Previous studies have shown that resting-state functional connectivity is associated with
outcome in coma patients and, when combined with machine learning algorithms,
outcome classification from connectivity data can outperform standard clinical
prognostication (Carrasco-Gómez et al., 2021; Keijzer et al., 2021; Kustermann et al.,
2019, 2020). However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have investigated taskbased EEG connectivity during the acute stages of severe brain injury. We predicted that
functional connectivity during the “Taken” task—which was specifically designed to
engage multiple sensory and cognitive systems—would be associated with survival and
later cognitive outcome (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2014, 2015).
Finally, we performed a simplified version of the EEG source localization procedure
presented in Chapter 2 to determine whether differential cortical activations during the
“Taken” audio (e.g., areas of the fronto-parietal network) were associated with recovery.
Our goal with these analyses was to identify patterns of neural activity across multiple
levels of analysis—or changes therein between conditions (intact, scrambled) and level of
sedation (on sedation, off sedation)—that may improve prognostic accuracy in acutely
comatose patients.

4.2.5

Correlated components analysis

As in Chapter 2 and 3 we performed a CorrCA to calculate ISCs between ICU patients
and healthy controls during the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken” (Laforge,
Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et al., 2020). Briefly, the CorrCA
identifies linear combinations of EEG activity that are maximally correlated between all
subjects in the data (Cohen & Parra, 2016; Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016).
Like other types of components analysis, CorrCA generates a set of voltage topographies
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(components) and time courses that are rank-ordered by the magnitude of their
correlation. As in Study 1 and Study 2, we focused our analyses on the top-ranked EEG
components from the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken”, as they reflect the neural
activity associated with processing the auditory features of the clip as well as its plot
(Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et al., 2020).
To calculate ISCs, we identified the top-ranked component across the group and backprojected its spatial weights onto the EEG data from each subject to isolate its time
course. We then correlated the time courses between all pairs of participants and
computed the average correlation coefficient between each participant and the rest of the
group. The average correlation for each participant represented their individual ISCs.
Finally, we used a leave-one-out approach combined with permutation testing to establish
a threshold for statistical significance for each subject. Specifically, we iteratively
recalculated the CorrCA, leaving one participant out during each iteration, and used the
subsequent component topography and time course to calculate unbiased ISCs for each
(left out) participant. To determine the statistical significance of the ISCs, we phaseshifted the time course of correlation coefficients between participants and performed a
1000 iteration resampling procedure to generate null distributions of correlation
coefficients for each subject. Mean ISCs with a magnitude that exceeded the top 5% of
the null distribution were interpreted as statistically significant. To compute the ISCs
between patients and controls, we back-projected the spatial weights of the top-ranked
component from the healthy control groups onto the EEG data from individual patients.
This produced a time course of component activity for each patient to correlate with that
of the healthy control group. The absolute correlation coefficient for each patient
represented the similarity of their neural activity to healthy controls during “Taken”. We
then tested the statistical significance of the absolute correlation coefficient for each
patient, audio condition, and level of sedation using the same permutation approach used
in the control group.
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4.2.6

Inter-electrode coherence

We have shown that the CorrCA can be used to assess sensory and cognitive processing
in behaviourally non-responsive patients (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020).
However, this approach only incorporates one dimension of the EEG data into its
calculations, namely, the fluctuations in EEG amplitude over time. The CorrCA does not,
for instance, account for changes across other features of the EEG signal like its
frequency or phase (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016). As such, CorrCA is not,
strictly speaking, a measure of functional connectivity; rather, it combines discrete
patterns of EEG activity to maximize correlations at the group level. More traditional
measures of EEG functional connectivity often integrate multiple dimensions of the EEG
signal to establish functional relationships in cortical neuronal activity (Bastos &
Schoffelen, 2016; Olejarczyk et al., 2017; Sakkalis, 2011; Sarmukadam et al., 2020). This
additional depth of analysis may further inform clinical prognostication of outcome in
acutely comatose patients. To this end, we calculated inter-electrode magnitude-squared
coherence—a commonly used measure of functional connectivity—to explore the
frequency dynamics of EEG data collected from individual patients in the ICU during
“Taken” (Keijzer et al., 2021; Kustermann et al., 2019, 2020; Lehembre et al., 2012).
Magnitude-squared coherence (MATLAB function ‘mscohere’) is an analysis technique
frequently applied to EEG data to quantify the phase synchrony between brain areas
(Bastos & Schoffelen, 2016; Bowyer, 2016). Coherence is mathematically similar to a
cross-correlation in that its squared value captures the amount of variance in one EEG
signal that can be explained by another. However, magnitude-squared coherence operates
along the frequency domain rather than time (Bastos & Schoffelen, 2016). Magnitudesquared coherence estimates the shared variance between signals x and y in each
frequency as a function of the power spectral densities 𝑃𝑥𝑥 and 𝑃𝑦𝑦 and the cross-power
spectral density 𝑃𝑥𝑦 (𝑓)|2 of x and y:
𝐶𝑥𝑦 (𝑓) =

|𝑃𝑥𝑦 (𝑓)|2

.

𝑃𝑥𝑥 (𝑓)𝑃𝑦𝑦 (𝑓)
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This procedure yields an estimate of the functional connectivity between x and y from 0
(no phase synchrony) to 1 (perfect phase synchrony) within a given frequency range and
resolution. Magnitude-squared coherence can also be calculated using a temporal sliding
window technique, similar to the tISCs described in Studies 1 and 2, to track dynamics in
EEG phase synchrony over time (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio
Serra, et al., 2020).
For this analysis, we calculated inter-electrode magnitude-squared coherence on the EEG
data collected from individual healthy participants from Study 1 and ICU patients during
the “Taken” task. We computed the coherence between all possible pairs of EEG
electrodes in 1s time bins from 0.5 - 55Hz with a frequency resolution of 0.25Hz. We
then averaged the coherence coefficients for each channel pair for each subject and
binned them into the canonical EEG frequency bands (Delta 0.5 - 4Hz, Theta 4 - 8Hz,
Alpha 8 - 12Hz, Beta 13 - 30Hz, Gamma 30 - 55Hz). Finally, we calculated the mean
coherence within each frequency band for each subject averaged over time. This
produced a single coherence coefficient within each frequency band, representing the
average whole-brain coherence across the total duration of “Taken”.
In order to meaningfully assess EEG coherence in acutely brain injured patients, we first
needed to establish a baseline of coherence in healthy controls during the “Taken” task.
We calculated inter-electrode coherence among the control sample and performed a 2 x 5
repeated measures ANOVA with audio condition and frequency band as factors. This
enabled us to quantify the overall EEG coherence among the healthy participants, explore
how coherence is distributed across different EEG frequency bands, and determine
whether either differed between audio conditions. We repeated this analysis on the
coherence data from ICU patients while they were on and off sedation to identify any
systematic differences in coherence relative to controls. To compare coherence between
patients and controls directly, we also performed a 2 x 5 x 2 mixed design ANOVA, both
while patients were on and off pharmacological sedation, with audio condition,
frequency, and group as factors,
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We also explored how patients’ neural activity changed in response to the different audio
conditions across different levels of sedation, and whether the extent of these changes
was associated with survival and recovery (Duclos et al., 2020). To this end, we
performed a 2 x 5 x 2 mixed design ANOVA to compare the magnitude of the difference
in coherence between each level of sedation across audio conditions (e.g., intact audio on
sedation minus intact audio off sedation). This model included audio condition and EEG
frequency as repeated measures factors and survival as a binary between subjects factor.
We then performed a follow-up 2 x 5 x 2 mixed design ANOVA to compare the
magnitude of the difference in coherence between audio conditions across levels of
sedation (e.g., intact audio on sedation minus scrambled audio on sedation). For this
model, we included level of sedation and EEG frequency as repeated measures factors
and survival as a binary between subjects factor.

4.2.7

Cortical source reconstruction

Finally, we performed a source localization procedure on the EEG data from the patient
sample to determine whether differences in cortical activation between audio conditions
or between levels of sedation were associated with recovery. For this analysis, we
performed a simplified version of the source reconstruction technique described in Study
1 (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020). We used the Brainstorm plugin for MATLAB
and its built-in OpenMEEG software to generate head and cortical models for each
patient based on MNI templates (Gramfort et al., 2010; Tadel et al., 2011). We chose to
use the standard model templates rather than those constructed from individual T1weighted structural MRI scans, as in Study 1, due to the limited availability of MRI scans
in this sample. The standard head model (called a forward model) specifies the
conductive properties of the skin, skull, white matter, grey matter, and cerebrospinal fluid
to estimate the cortical electrical currents from the electrical potentials recorded by the
EEG sensors (Gramfort et al., 2010). With the forward model, the Brainstorm software
applies an inverse model solution to localize the likely source of the activity on 3D
cortical surface model made from a folded tessellated flat map of 2D voxels or “vertices”
(Gramfort et al., 2010; Tadel et al., 2011). All cortical surface models used in this study
contained 15,002 vertices to balance spatial resolution with computational cost.
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Like Study 1, we applied a wMNE inverse model to identify the cortical generators of the
EEG activity recorded from patients during “Taken” (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al.,
2020). The wMNE approach treats source reconstruction of EEG data as a linear imaging
problem such that the current density at the level of the cortex approximates the observed
EEG data when filtered through the forward model. wMNEs apply a regularization
constraint (in this case, Tikhonov regularization) to favour minimum energy solutions
that more closely approximate biologically plausible electrical currents. This method also
controls for systematic noise in the data by modelling the noise at baseline (i.e., before
the “Taken” audio begins) to improve solution accuracy. Finally, wMNEs apply a depthweighting to the inverse solutions to amplify sources that are deeper in the cortex (e.g.,
within sulci) that may otherwise be overwhelmed by more superficial sources
(Gorodnitsky et al., 1992; Hämäläinen, 2010; Hincapié et al., 2016). Like regularization
and noise modelling, depth-weighting improves the accuracy and biological plausibility
of the source solutions.
In general, wMNEs apply a linear inverse operator to the EEG data observed over N
channels. With an M x N matrix, where M is the number of sources, the linear inverse
operator follows a Bayesian approach
𝑀 = 𝑅′𝐺 𝑇 (𝐺𝑅 ′ 𝐺 𝑇 + 𝐶)−1
where G is the gain matrix of the strength of the sources, C is the noise covariance
matrix, and R’ is the covariance of the sources. Current amplitudes at time t are
calculated as
ĵ(𝑡) = 𝑀𝑥 (𝑡)
where x(t) is the EEG at time t. To regularize the source estimates, the unknown variance
of the current is expressed as R′ = R/λ2 which produces the inverse operator
𝑀 = 𝑅𝐺 𝑇 (𝐺𝑅𝐺 𝑇 + 𝜆2 𝐶)−1
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where the amplitude of the unknown current is estimated as the regularization parameter
λ2. wMNEs also minimize the cost function of the solutions as
𝑆 = ẽ𝑇 ẽ + 𝜆2 𝑗 𝑇 𝑅 −1 𝑗
where the first term represents the difference between whitened EEG data and the activity
predicted by the model and the second term is the weighted norm of the current estimate.
As λ2 increases, the source term receives additional weight and larger differences
between the predicted and real data become more acceptable (Hämäläinen, 2010). After
data whitening and scaling, the noise covariance matrix C is regularized as
C′′ = C + ∑𝑘 𝜀𝑘 𝜎𝑘−2 𝐼 𝑘
where k moves across the EEG channels (with regularization factors 𝜀𝑘 , 𝜎−
𝑘
which represent the average variances across channels) and I(k) are diagonal matrices of
ones for the channels in each group. After regularization of the covariance matrix, the
source solutions can be solved for using an expression of the inverse operator. These
predicted solutions are then noise-normalized and compared to the measured data to
quantify the correctness of the regularization procedure. Finally, source estimates are
adjusted to conform to the anatomical constraints of the cortices and weighted for depth
(Hämäläinen, 2010).
We applied a wMNE solution to the EEG data collected from patients during the intact
and scrambled versions of “Taken” both while they were on and off pharmacological
sedation. Unlike the source reconstruction procedure described in Study 1, we did not
regress the CorrCA component time course onto patient cortical activity. Instead, we
examined the initial source solutions to determine whether differences in overall cortical
activation—not just those corresponding to a single component—were associated with
recovery from severe brain injury. To this end, we computed the wMNE at each time
point in the EEG recordings (250Hz over 5 min.) for each patient, condition, and level of
sedation.
Here, we performed paired one-directional Wilcoxon sign-rank tests to identify
significant differences in source activity between the intact and scrambled audio
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conditions at each level of sedation (intact > scrambled; scrambled > intact; on and off
sedation). We predicted that, if the “Taken” paradigm is effective in acutely comatose
patients, we would find differential activation of the fronto-parietal and temporal cortices
during the intact and scrambled audio conditions. We also expected that differences in
cortical activation during each condition would be reduced while patients were on
sedation; however, the combined effects of acute brain injury and pharmacological
sedation on narrative processing are not well understood (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al.,
2020; Naci et al., 2015). We then contrasted the source estimates within the same audio
condition when patients were on and off sedation (intact audio off sedation > intact audio
on sedation) using the same statistical procedure. Finally, we performed an independent
Student’s t-test to identify differences in the source activity between the group of patients
who survived (N = 3) and those who did not (N = 2) to detect potential neural markers of
survival. Statistical significance for all tests was established using a 100,000 iteration
Monte Carlo simulation procedure.

4.3 Results
4.3.1

Inter-subject synchronization in acute brain injury

We analyzed the EEG data from the patient sample using a CorrCA to investigate
whether their neural activity was suggestive of higher-order cognitive processing during
“Taken”. First, we calculated the CorrCA for each patient during the scrambled version
of “Taken”. At the group level, the absolute ISCs for 3/5 (60%) of patients decreased
after sedation was withdrawn, though this was not statistically significant across the
group, t(4) = 0.984, p = 0.809. None of the five patients in this sample showed significant
ISCs with the control group during the scrambled audio condition (Figure 6A). This was
the case while patients were receiving pharmacological sedation (M = 0.014, SD = 0.010)
and after sedation was withdrawn (M = 0.009, SD = 0.003). During the intact version of
“Taken”, the absolute ISCs for 4/5 patients increased significantly after pausing sedation,
t(4) = 2.280, p = 0.042. While on sedation, none of the patients were significantly
correlated to the controls (M = 0.012, SD = 0.009). However, after sedation was
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withdrawn (M = 0.020, SD = 0.012), Patient 2 and Patient 4 (2/5; or 40%) showed
significant ISCs with controls (Figure 6B).
We predicted that significant correlations with controls during the intact version of
“Taken” would predict survival and, potentially, overall degree of recovery. However,
Patient 4 was the only patient who both survived and was significantly correlated to
controls during this task; Patient 2 was also significantly correlated with the healthy
group but life-sustaining treatment was eventually withdrawn due to poor clinical
prognosis related to complications from pneumonia. Conversely, Patient 1 and Patient 5
also survived but did not show significant ISCs with controls during the task. Overall,
these results provide mixed evidence for the utility of the CorrCA during the “Taken”
task to predict outcome in patients with acute severe brain injury.

Figure 6. Magnitude of ISCs between patients with acute brain injury and healthy
controls.
A) The magnitude of the ISCs between healthy controls and individual patients during the
scrambled version of “Taken” while patients were receiving pharmacological sedation
(panel A left) and after sedation was paused (panel A right). B) The magnitude of the
ISCs between healthy controls and individual patients during the intact version of
“Taken” while patients were receiving pharmacological sedation (panel B left) and after
sedation was paused (panel B right). Note: * signifies statistically significant ISCs (p <
0.05).
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4.3.2

Coherence dynamics during naturalistic auditory stimulation

In addition to the CorrCA, we analyzed functional connectivity in patients and controls
during the “Taken” paradigm. To establish a baseline of coherence during the “Taken”
task, we calculate inter-electrode coherence among the healthy control group from Study
1. A 2 x 5 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that mean inter-electrode coherence was
not significantly different between audio conditions, F(1,14) = 3.225, p = 0.094.
However, coherence was not uniformly distributed across frequency bands, F(4, 56) =
34.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.711; mean coherence in the Delta frequency band (0.5 – 4Hz)
was significantly higher than Theta (4 – 8Hz), Beta (12 – 30Hz), and Gamma (30 –
55Hz). Additionally, coherence in Theta and Alpha were significantly higher than both
the Beta and Gamma frequencies (Figure 7) across conditions (Tukey HSD p < 0.05,
Holm corrected). There was no significant interaction between condition and frequency,
F(4, 56) = 0.396, p = 0.811. These results showed that inter-electrode coherence during
“Taken” was most prominent among lower frequencies and decreased systematically
across higher frequency bands.
We repeated this analysis to explore whole-brain functional connectivity in patients
across audio conditions and different levels of sedation. First, we performed a 2 x 5
repeated measure ANOVA on the intact and scrambled audio conditions within the same
level of sedation (e.g., scrambled audio vs intact audio on sedation). However, we did not
find any significant differences in inter-electrode coherence across condition, F(1, 4) =
0.121, p = 0.746, frequency band, F(4, 16) = 2.731, p = 0.066, or any interaction between
the two while patients were on sedation, F(4, 16) = 0.467, p = 0.759, (Figure 8A).
Similarly, we did not find any significant differences in coherence between audio
conditions, F(1, 4) = 0.958, p = 0.383, or frequencies, F(4, 16) = 1.673, p = 0.205, and no
interaction, F(4, 16) = 1.887, p = 0.162, after sedation was withdrawn (Figure 8B).
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Figure 7. Inter-electrode coherence across EEG frequency bands in healthy controls
during the “Taken” task.
Mean coherence across all EEG channels among healthy controls during the scrambled
(left) and intact versions of the “Taken” audio. Although there was no systematic
difference in coherence between audio conditions, coherence varied significantly between
frequency bands, irrespective of audio condition. Note: error bars reflect standard error.
Our next analyses focused on the mean coherence within each audio condition between
levels of sedation (e.g., scrambled audio on sedation vs. scrambled audio off). For the
scrambled audio condition, we found no significant differences in coherence between
level of sedation, F(1, 4) = 0.343, p = 0.590, or frequency band, F(4, 16) = 1.328, p =
0.302, nor did we find a significant interaction between these factors, F(4, 16) = 0.508, p
= 0.731 (Figure 8A). However, a 2 x 5 repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
effect of frequency, F(4, 16) = 3.794, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.487, during the intact audio
condition, though only between the Delta (0.5 – 4Hz) and Alpha (8 – 12Hz) bands
(Tukey HSD p = 0.031, Holm corrected).
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Figure 8. Inter-electrode coherence between patients with acute brain injury during the
“Taken” task.
A) Mean inter-electrode coherence across patients during the scrambled (panel A left)
and intact (panel A right) versions of “Taken” while receiving continuous
pharmacological sedation. B) Mean inter-electrode coherence across patients during the
scrambled (panel B left) and intact (panel B right) versions of “Taken” after sedation
was paused. As in healthy controls, there were no significant difference in EEG
coherence between audio conditions at either level of sedation. Additionally, there were
no systematic differences in mean inter-electrode coherence between EEG frequency
bands. Note: error bars represent standard error.
We then compared the functional connectivity across patients to the healthy control group
to identify any group-level differences in coherence during the “Taken” task. We
accomplished this by performing a 2 x 5 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA on the coherence
data from the control group and patients while they were on and off sedation. While
patients were on sedation, we found a significant effect of frequency across both groups,
F(4, 72) = 15.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.464, and a significant frequency by group interaction,
F(4, 72) = 4.599, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.204. On the frequency factor, mean coherence was
highest in the Delta frequency band for all participants and patients (Tukey HSD p <
0.001, Holm corrected). For the frequency by group interaction, coherence was highest
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among the lower frequency bands for healthy controls. We found a similar effect in
patients, as Delta coherence was significantly higher than in the Alpha band (Tukey HSD
p < 0.001, Holm corrected).
When patients were off sedation, we found a similar main effect of frequency, F(4, 72) =
11.091, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.381, and another frequency by group interaction, F(4, 72) =
4.752 p = 0.002, η2 = 0.209. Like the previous analysis, mean coherence in Delta was
significantly higher than in any other frequency band across all participants (Tukey HSD
p ≤ 0.001). However, the frequency by group interaction was slightly different; here, we
found that Delta coherence among healthy controls was significantly higher than Beta or
Gamma. Coherence in the Theta and Alpha frequencies was significantly higher than in
Gamma for the control group. Lastly, the magnitude of Delta coherence in patients was
significantly higher than Gamma coherence in the control group (Tukey HSD, p < 0.001
Holm corrected). Overall, these analyses found only minor differences in mean coherence
between patients and controls, though significant differences exist between EEG
frequencies across all participants.
Although we did not find any significant differences in coherence within the patient
group, we further explored these data by analyzing the absolute differences in mean
coherence between audio conditions (i.e., scrambled minus intact) and levels of sedation
(i.e., on sedation minus off sedation). We performed two separate 2 x 5 x 2 mixed design
ANOVAs to determine whether differences in coherence across frequency bands, either
between levels of sedation or audio conditions, were associated with patient survival.
First, we computed the absolute difference in coherence between levels of sedation
within each frequency band and compared the magnitude of these differences between
audio conditions. In this analysis, two significant interactions emerged. First, we found a
significant condition by frequency interaction, F(4, 12) = 10.122, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.771.
However, given the low statistical power of this sample, none of the post hoc contrasts
survived correction for multiple comparisons. We also found a significant three-way
interaction between frequency, condition, and survival, F(4, 12) = 5.875, p = 0.007, η2p =
0.662 but, like the previous interaction effect, no follow-up contrasts survived correction
for multiple comparisons (Figure 9A).
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Finally, we examined the absolute difference between audio conditions at each level of
sedation to determine whether mean coherence was associated with survival after severe
brain injury. We found a significant three-way interaction between level of sedation,
frequency, and survival, F(4, 12) = 4.907, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.621. While none of the post
hoc comparisons remained significant after correction, we performed a repeated contrast
analysis on the interaction term. This analysis revealed that differences between audio
conditions in the Beta (13 - 30 Hz) and Gamma (30 - 55Hz) frequencies across levels of
sedation may be associated with survival.

Figure 9. Differences in EEG coherence among patients between levels of sedation and
audio condition.
A) The absolute difference in inter-electrode coherence during “Taken” between levels of
sedation (on sedation – off sedation) for patients who did not recover from their injury.
B) The absolute difference in inter-electrode coherence during “Taken” between levels of
sedation for patients who recovered. Although this analysis revealed two significant
interactions, neither survived correction for multiple comparisons. C) The absolute
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difference in inter-electrode coherence between audio conditions (scrambled – intact)
across levels of sedation for patients who did not recover from their injury. D) The
absolute difference in inter-electrode coherence between audio conditions across levels
of sedation for patients who recovered. There was a significant three-way interaction
between level of sedation, frequency, and survival. Repeated contrasts revealed that
differences in Beta and Gamma coherence could differentiate the two patient groups (p <
0.05).
Surprisingly, this analysis revealed that differences between audio conditions in the Beta
(compared to Gamma) and Gamma frequencies (p < 0.05) were higher for patients who
did not recover. In other words, patients who would not survive their injury showed
increased variability among higher frequencies during the “Taken” task than those who
would (Figure 9B). This suggests that the stability of functional connectivity between
levels of sedation may be clinically informative and could be used to improve
prognostication after serious brain injury (Duclos et al., 2020, 2021).

4.3.3

Cortical reconstruction of EEG activity across conscious
states

For the final analysis of this study, we conducted a source localization analysis on the
EEG activity from ICU patients during “Taken” to identify cortical activity that may
predict survival and later recovery from severe brain injury. We applied a wMNE to the
full (5 min.) EEG recordings from each patient and performed group-level contrasts on
the localized cortical activity across audio conditions and level of sedation. We predicted
that disparities in cortical activations during “Taken” may provide additional prognostic
information and could be used in conjunction with the CorrCA and inter-electrode
coherence techniques to inform prognosis. All statistical tests were performed in a vertexwise fashion between conditions or group and was established using a permutation test
approach. Cortical regions were identified using Brainstorm’s Desikan-Killiany atlas
(Tadel et al., 2011).
We first examined the differences in cortical activation between the intact and scrambled
versions of “Taken” while patients were on sedation. We performed two one-directional
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paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the activations from all patients, irrespective of
outcome. During the intact audio condition (intact > scrambled), we found significantly
higher activation in bilateral superior parietal cortex and in the right anterior region of the
mid-frontal lobe (Figure 10A). During the scrambled audio condition (scrambled >
intact), we found significantly higher activation across the left temporal lobe down to the
temporal pole, as well as small areas of activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus and
lateral left post-central gyrus (Figure 10B).
We used the same statistical procedure to contrast patients’ cortical activity during the
intact and audio scrambled conditions after pharmacological sedation was withdrawn. For
the intact version of “Taken” (intact > scrambled), we found significantly higher bilateral
activations in anterior regions of the mid-frontal cortex, the left superior and inferior
frontal gyri, areas of the left postcentral gyrus, and the right inferior temporal cortex
(Figure 11A). In contrast, during the scrambled version of “Taken” (scrambled > intact),
our analyses revealed higher activations in the orbitofrontal and pre-central gyri, as well
as in the inferior, mid-, and superior temporal cortices (Figure11B). Interestingly, the
differences in cortical activation between the two audio conditions were comparable to
those found among healthy controls in Study 1 and in fMRI, irrespective of level of
sedation (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2015). While the differences
in cortical activity between audio conditions were less pronounced in acutely comatose
patients, the differential activations across fronto-parietal and temporal cortices suggest
that the “Taken” paradigm remains effective in patients with acute DOC.
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Figure 10. Comparisons of source reconstructed EEG from patients receiving continuous
pharmacological sedation during the “Taken” task.
A) Areas where source reconstructed EEG activity was significantly higher during the
intact version of “Taken” while patients were on sedation. B) Areas where source
reconstructed EEG activity was significantly higher during the scrambled version of
“Taken” while patients were on sedation. Note: red areas represent significant t values
(p < 0.05 after Monte Carlo simulation).
To determine whether source localized neural activity has prognostic clinical utility, we
performed independent permutation t-tests to compare cortical activity during the
“Taken” task between patients who survived and those who did not. While patients were
on sedation, we found only sparse islands of activity (i.e., single vertex differences) that
differentiated the groups in either audio condition, which most likely reflected noise or
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Figure 11. Comparisons of source reconstructed EEG from non-sedated patients during
the “Taken” task.
A) Areas where source reconstructed EEG activity was significantly higher during the
intact version of “Taken”. B) Areas where source reconstructed EEG activity was
significantly higher during the scrambled version of “Taken”. Note: red areas represent
significant t values (p < 0.05 after Monte Carlo simulation).
statistical error. The same was largely true for patients while they were off sedation as
well, with the exception of one small patch of activity in the mid-frontal cortex that was
significantly higher for survivors during the intact version of “Taken”. Although the
magnitude of the difference in this area was relatively high compared to the previous
contrasts it too was most likely a statistical artifact because of its limited spatial extent
(Hassan et al., 2014). Overall, the results of the source localization analyses were
somewhat aligned with our predictions about the utility of the “Taken” task in acutely
comatose patients. However, given the small sample size in this study, establishing, and
verifying its prognostic value will require further research.
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4.4 Discussion
4.4.1

Main findings

The primary aim of this study was to determine whether the “Taken” paradigm could be
used to identify EEG markers of preserved sensory and cognitive function in patients
with severe acute brain injury. Here, we developed two general hypotheses: 1) patients
who recover are more likely to have produced neural activity indicative of sensory and
cognitive processing during the “Taken” task and 2) the magnitude of the changes in EEG
activity between levels of sedation would be associated with outcome (Duclos et al.,
2020; Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Laforge, Incio Serra, et al., 2020). Overall,
we can draw three main conclusions from this study.
First, we found that two of five patients could produce patterns of neural activity
comparable to healthy controls during the “Taken” task. The EEG activity from Patient 2
and Patient 4 was significantly correlated with healthy controls’ (significant ISCs) during
the intact version of the audio but only while they were off sedation. Second, we found
marginal evidence that differences in EEG functional connectivity between audio
conditions may be related to outcome; differences in high-frequency inter-electrode
coherence were significantly smaller for patients who recovered from their injury.
Importantly, this pattern of connectivity was similar to what we observed among healthy
controls, specifically, that connectivity did not differ significantly between audio
conditions in the control group. While this suggests that stability among high-frequency
brain networks could be an indicator of good recovery, given the small sample size of the
patient group, this finding should be interpreted with caution. Finally, we observed that
the patterns of source localized EEG activity among ICU patients listening to “Taken”
were somewhat aligned with previous findings in healthy controls (Laforge, GonzalezLara, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2015). EEG activity primarily arose from frontal and
parietal cortices during the intact audio condition, whereas the scrambled audio generated
more activity from temporal regions. Although cortical activity alone could not
differentiate patients with good and poor outcomes, these findings support the use of the
“Taken” paradigm in this population.
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4.4.2

Patient outcomes: Sensitivity, specificity, and practical
considerations

Patient mortality was the main outcome measure used in this study. Three of the five
patients who underwent EEG assessment recovered: Patient 1, Patient 4, and Patient 5. Of
these patients, only Patient 4 showed significant ISCs with healthy controls during the
intact version of “Taken”. Although a test sensitivity of 33% is relatively low, there are
many factors to consider when interpreting this result. Principally, the heterogeneity
between patients with acute serious brain injury poses a significant challenge, especially
in limited samples like the one presented here. Variables like injury type and severity, or
the time between hospitalization and EEG assessment make it difficult to validate novel
prognostic tools, especially in limited samples. Another significant consideration is the
brief window of time in which our assessments occurred. Like patients with chronic
DOC, patients with acute brain injury experience fluctuations in wakefulness and
awareness, which decreases the likelihood of capturing a patient’s true cognitive state in a
single assessment (Bareham et al., 2018, 2020). Similarly, patients may be experiencing
delirium—a common symptom of serious brain injury—which, even if patients were
awake and aware, would have inhibited their ability to follow the narrative (Ganau et al.,
2018; Maneewong et al., 2017). In this way, performing neural assessments at multiple
time points throughout a patient’s stay in hospital would increase the probability of
detecting significant ISCs during “Taken” (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020).
In a similar vein, we designed our assessment protocol around routine withdrawals of
sedation. This enabled us to examine the degree to which patients’ neural activity
reconfigured when they regained wakefulness and, perhaps, awareness. However, this
approach also introduced additional confounds to the study. Principally, all patients in
this study received pharmacological sedation before EEG testing. Previous research has
shown that anesthetic agents have a profound and lasting impact on neural activity (Chen
et al., 2009; Colon et al., 2017; MacDonald et al., 2015) which may have biased our
comparisons to EEG data from non-sedated healthy controls. Likewise, the type of
sedative(s) administered, the amounts given, and individual metabolic rates affect the
depth of sedation and its duration, further complicating our interpretation of these results

121

(Hans et al., 2005; Park et al., 2020; Waschkies et al., 2015). Although we worked
closely with critical care staff to ensure patients’ physiological status indicated a return to
baseline after sedation was withdrawn, we cannot discount the possibility that its residual
effects influenced these results.
The significant ISCs exhibited by Patient 2 during the “Taken” task also warrants further
interpretation. Both Patient 2 and Patient 4 showed significant ISCs with healthy controls
during the intact version of the audio. Unfortunately, unlike Patient 4, Patient 2 did not
recover from her injuries. While this reduced the overall specificity of our paradigm
(50% true negative; 50% false positive), it is worth noting that Patient 2 was highly
reactive after sedation was withdrawn. So reactive, in fact, that she remained on
continuous sedation, in part, to reduce her agitation and ensure that her behaviour did not
pose a risk to her treatment. By all accounts, Patient 2 was awake and at least minimally
aware of her surroundings during the second presentation of “Taken” and her significant
ISCs with controls likely reflected this. Additionally, Patient 2 did not succumb to her
primary injury, but from complications related to pneumonia. As such, we cannot know
whether Patient 2 would have survived her brain injury. Nevertheless, her behaviourally
responsivity and significant ISCs suggested that she retained the cognitive capabilities to
process the audio which, in other contexts, have been shown to predict better outcome
(Chatelle et al., 2020; Claassen et al., 2019; Sokoliuk et al., 2021).
Comparing the functional connectivity among the patients in this sample, we found two
EEG features that distinguish survivors from non-survivors. Namely, the magnitude of
the difference in EEG coherence between audio conditions (i.e., between intact and
scrambled “Taken”) was higher in the Beta and Gamma frequencies for patients who did
not survive. This finding is somewhat unique with respect to previous studies that, for the
most part, report that EEG activity among lower frequencies (i.e., Delta – Alpha) are
most associated with recovery (O’Donnell et al., 2021; Pauli et al., 2020). However,
many of these studies focused on resting state EEG and none have used naturalistic
narrative stimuli. Naturalistic stimuli like movies and stories differentially modulate EEG
activity across a broad frequency spectrum. Indeed, Alpha activity is often associated
with attentional processes during naturalistic perception (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et
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al., 2016), Beta oscillations have been shown to predict individual movie preferences and
are involved in reward processing (Boksem & Smidts, 2015; Christoforou et al., 2017),
and the Gamma band has been linked to theory of mind and emotion (Panzica et al.,
2019; Yang et al., 2020). During naturalistic tasks, therefore, we might expect broadband
differences in EEG activity across task conditions, levels of awareness, and, here, injury
severity or comorbid pathologies.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to uncover the cognitive or physiological
bases of the differences we found between Beta and Gamma connectivity in this sample,
it is important to highlight the similarity in EEG connectivity between healthy controls
and survivors. Neither healthy controls nor patients who survived their injury showed
significant differences in EEG coherence between the two audio conditions. This was not
the case for non-survivors; non-survivors showed larger differences in Beta and Gamma
coherence during the intact audio condition. While the clinical implications of this effect
are unknown, variability in Beta and Gamma coherence during the “Taken” task may
provide an early brain-based marker of recovery in this population. However, additional
research is needed to replicate this effect and determine if it is statistically reliable among
larger cohorts of patients with severe acute brain injury.

4.4.3

True coma and secondary brain injury

Compared to other DOC, the comatose state is arguably the most severe. Patients in a
coma do not exhibit behavioural or neurological signs of wakefulness, nor do they
produce behavioural responses to stimulation or their environment (though reflex
movements may be preserved). Fortunately, true coma is rare and often resolves quickly
(Laureys et al., 2004, 2009; Tart, 2001; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976; Young, 2000). During
this period, however, patients in ICU often receive continuous pharmacological sedation
to stabilize and regulate vital processes and minimize their discomfort. In effect, standard
of care means that many patients with severe acute brain injury are kept in a medically
induced coma during the early stages of recovery. This raises an interesting question
about whether the patients in this study were truly comatose or whether their level of
awareness reflected the effects of sedatives and other medications (e.g., opioids).
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We aimed to address this question by administering the GCS before and after sedation
was paused during the EEG assessment. Only Patient 2 exhibited notable changes in
behaviour after sedation was withdrawn (as described in Section 4.2 and displayed in
Table 2). As such, it was impossible to know from the GCS whether the remaining four
patients were truly comatose, experiencing residual effects of sedation, or whether they
were conscious but incapable of responding. Alternatively, the results of the CorrCA,
suggested that both Patient 2 and Patient 4 could process the narrative of “Taken” while
off sedation and, accordingly, were awake and aware during the task. While we cannot be
certain about the true cognitive states of the remaining patients, as null findings do not
necessarily indicate a lack of awareness, these results suggest that the “Taken” task and
the CorrCA can be used to identify early markers of residual cognition in behaviourally
non-responsive ICU patients.
Finally, the issue of primary versus secondary brain injury should be explored in more
detail. Five of the six patients who underwent EEG assessment in this study were
admitted to ICU after cardiac arrest, not severe brain injury per se (e.g., trauma, stroke).
Although cardiac arrest does not necessarily cause significant neurological damage, we
have strong evidence to suggest that these patients did experience secondary anoxic brain
injury as a result. First, medical charts indicated that each of these patients experienced a
loss of consciousness during their arrest. This strongly suggests a sustained, severe lack
of oxygen in the brain and, consequently, some degree of anoxic injury. Second, multiple
patients received therapeutic hypothermic treatment in ICU to limit post-anoxic
encephalopathy (Beccaria et al., 2010; Nolan et al., 2003). Although this can be
administered as a preventative measure before a full neurological investigation is
complete (e.g., MRI or CT scan), therapeutic hypothermic treatment is typically used
when the severity of the arrest suggests imminent anoxic injury. Lastly, all the patients in
this study were at most, minimally responsive upon admission to ICU. Remaining
behaviourally non-responsive following a return of spontaneous circulation can indicate
anoxic brain injury, though comorbidities like shock may also be a factor (Jozwiak et al.,
2020).
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4.4.4

Conclusion and future Directions

Overall, we found moderate support that the EEG “Taken” paradigm can be used to
detect covert cognitive function in behaviourally non-responsive ICU patients. By
combining three analytic techniques, we were able to: 1) identify patients who showed
neural evidence of preserved covert cognitive function despite remaining behaviourally
non-responsive, 2) differentiate survivors from non-survivors through high-frequency
EEG connectivity, and 3) verify that the task is recruiting many of the same cortical areas
observed in Study 1 and in fMRI (Laforge, Gonzalez-Lara, et al., 2020; Naci et al., 2015).
One significant limitation of this study is its small sample size (Note: the COVID-19
pandemic and subsequent lockdown measures effectively stopped patient screening and
recruitment for this study). Although the CorrCA was designed to assess neural function
in individual patients, substantially larger cohorts of patients would be required to
replicate the group-level effects reported here. Future studies should aim to recruit many
patients across multiple age groups, etiologies, and critical care centers to determine
whether the results presented in this study reliably predict outcome after severe brain
injury. Additionally, we did not collect physician prediction of outcomes in this study.
This limits our ability to compare these results to behavioural assessments and physician
expertise. Collecting this data will be crucial to validate that the “Taken” task, and the
analytic techniques presented here, perform as well or better than standard clinical
measures alone (Duclos et al., 2020). If this is the case, the “Taken” paradigm may
provide a powerful bedside assessment of neural and cognitive function for patients with
severe acute brain injury.
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Chapter 5
5

General Discussion

4.5 Summary and Key Findings
Establishing awareness in patients with severe brain injury is a considerable challenge.
Standardized behavioural assessments remain the gold standard in critical care and
outpatient settings (Bagnato et al., 2017; Giacino et al., 2009). However, these are limited
in precisely the cases where conscious awareness remains indeterminate. Many patients
with acute and chronic disorders of consciousness (DOC) experience significant motor
impairments. This critically reduces the sensitivity of behavioural assessments and, thus,
their diagnostic and prognostic accuracy (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993;
Schnakers et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2020). Assessments of awareness that use
neuroimaging technologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
electroencephalography (EEG) offer a powerful alternative to clinical behavioural
measures (Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Owen, 2013; Owen & Coleman, 2007).
Recent years have seen the rapid development of many brain-based proxies of commandfollowing (Cruse et al., 2011; Monti et al., 2010; Naci et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2006) as
well as methods to investigate perception and certain cognitively mediated functions at
the neural level (Berlingeri et al., 2019; Bruno et al., 2010; Kondziella et al., 2016;
Schiff, 2006). Neural assessments have drastically improved the detection of awareness
in behaviourally non-responsive individuals. However, many are not well suited to the
specific impairments of patients with severe brain injury, and few techniques can speak to
the conscious experience of DOC patients. On the other hand, neural assessments that use
naturalistic stimuli—like the ones developed by Naci et al. (2014, 2015)—can be used to
infer visual, auditory, and “higher-order” executive processing of complex stimuli from
single-trial recordings.
The primary goal of this thesis was to develop and validate an EEG version of Naci et
al.’s fMRI movie paradigms (2014, 2015) to assess cognitive function through intersubject correlations (ISCs) in patients with chronic and acute DOC. In contrast to fMRI,
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EEG is a low-cost and portable neuroimaging device that is widely available in clinical
settings, making it ideal for patients with severe brain injury. However, the limited spatial
resolution of EEG required a different method to calculate ISCs, both at the group level
and for individual subjects. The study presented in Chapter 2 described the specific
experimental design for our EEG assessment, the computational procedures we used for
calculating ISCs, and the validation steps we performed to ensure that EEG ISCs reliably
captured executive processing of the movies (Cohen & Parra, 2016; Cohen et al., 2017;
Dmochowski et al., 2012).
In that study, we demonstrated that EEG could capture ISCs between participants during
“Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken” and that they were statistically robust at the singlesubject level—a necessary condition for any assessment designed for DOC patients. We
also found that the time course of ISCs were significantly correlated to suspense ratings
for both intact movies, but not for the scrambled versions. Combined with the source
reconstruction of the frontoparietal executive network during the intact version of
“Taken”, these results suggested that our EEG ISCs analyses captured similar neural
processes described by Naci et al. (2014, 2015). When we applied this paradigm to a
cohort of 13 patients with DOC, we found that 25% and 30% of patients produced a
pattern of neural activity that was significantly correlated with healthy controls’ during
“Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken”, respectively. While significant ISCs with controls do
not provide definitive evidence of conscious awareness per se, they provide strong
evidence of the preserved perceptual and cognitive functions that support it (Boly et al.,
2017; Naci et al., 2014). Moreover, this estimate (25 - 30% of patients) is in the same
range as those presented in previous studies, despite using a different assessment
technique (Kondziella et al., 2016; Monti et al., 2010)—further strengthening the validity
of these results.
Chapter 3 explored whether the EEG “Taken” paradigm—the task with the highest
proportion of patient responders in Chapter 2—could be extended to non-English
speaking populations of DOC patients. The motivation for this study was to provide
normative ISCs data from a sample of French-speaking individuals during a translated (to
French) version of the “Taken” audio. In doing so, we hoped to establish a benchmark of
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ISCs in this new sample for later use in DOC patients across Canada. Here, we found that
the French version of “Taken” produced comparable degrees of ISCs as the English
version but at different time points throughout the audio; both versions produced a
similar frequency of significant ISCs throughout the audio, but the periods in which they
occurred varied between languages. However, we determined that this effect was driven
by a consistent timing offset between the two versions of the audio rather than intrinsic
differences between the narratives themselves. Overall, these results support the use of
the translated “Taken” paradigm to assess perceptual and executive processing in cohorts
of French-speaking DOC patients.
In Chapter 4, we examined the feasibility of using the EEG “Taken” paradigm in critical
care settings. Here, we aimed to determine whether we could detect neural markers of
perceptual and cognitive function in a sample of acutely comatose patients and evaluate
the prognostic utility of our assessment. In this study, we presented the intact and
scrambled versions of “Taken” to patients while they were receiving continuous
pharmacological sedation and again after sedation was withdrawn. This enabled us to
calculate the differences in ISCs, functional connectivity, and source-localized EEG
between conscious states and examine whether the degree of change predicted later
outcomes.
After withdrawal of sedation, two of the five patients produced significant ISCs with
controls during the intact version of “Taken”, but only one survived. Conversely, one
patient who did not show any significant ISCs with controls survived, providing mixed
evidence of the prognostic value of ISCs in this population. We found that variability in
group-level functional connectivity during the task was marginally associated with
survival from acute brain injury. Specifically, the differences in high-frequency EEG
connectivity between audio conditions were smaller—neural activity was more stable—
in patients who would survive their injury. Relative to patients who would not survive,
this pattern more closely approximated what we observed in healthy control participants.
Finally, source localized EEG activity revealed the predicted frontoparietal-temporal
divide between the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken” in acutely comatose
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patients. However, cortically reconstructed activity was not associated with outcomes in
this sample.
Over three studies, we developed, tested, and validated an EEG analysis technique that
enables us to assess perceptual and cognitive processing in patients with chronic and
acute DOC. We have also demonstrated that this technique is suitable for different
populations of DOC patients (i.e., English or French speaking; chronic or acute) and can
account for the specific perceptual abilities of individual patients (i.e., audio-visual, audio
only). Finally, while the prognostic efficacy of the EEG “Taken” paradigm remains to be
determined, we found marginal evidence that a multi-method EEG analysis could
uncover clinically meaningful patterns of neural activity that may inform outcome
predictions in patients with severe acute brain injury.

4.6 Contributions to the Field
Despite the large and growing repertoire of neural assessments for patients with DOC,
our EEG movie task, ISCs analysis protocol, and applications described in this thesis
contribute to the broader literature in three unique ways. First, by successfully adapting
the movie paradigms presented by Naci et al. (2014, 2015) for EEG, we have made this
assessment a viable option for a considerably larger proportion of patients with chronic
and acute DOC. As stated previously, EEG is a cost-effective and portable neuroimaging
device that is widely available (Cruse et al., 2011, 2012; Naci et al., 2012). As such, it is
much more likely that researchers and clinical staff can access the necessary tools for this
assessment compared to those required for fMRI. Furthermore, the results of the
numerous validation steps outlined in Chapter 2, while not unique in themselves—
ostensibly replicating the findings from Naci et al.—strongly support the validity of this
EEG-based version of the paradigm.
However, we were not the first to propose using naturalistic stimuli and EEG to assess
patients with DOC. Iotzov et al. (2017) used a similar ISCs analysis to compare neural
activity in healthy controls and patients with chronic DOC during two types of
naturalistic speech stimuli (both presented forward and backward). They found that, as a
group, patients with DOC exhibited lower ISCs overall than healthy controls and that
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ISCs scale with behavioural diagnosis. Additionally, in healthy controls, ISCs were
significantly higher during the forward speech condition than backward speech, but ISCs
in patients did not differ between conditions. While these findings are informative, there
are key differences between Iotzov and colleagues’ assessment and our own. Iotzov and
colleagues did not design their task to assess cognitive function in individual DOC
patients; they examined group-level differences in ISCs that varied by clinical status (i.e.,
healthy controls, DOC patients) and behavioural diagnosis. They also used ISCs to
corroborate, rather than inform, behavioural diagnosis in patients with DOC. For these
reasons, our assessment—specifically designed to supplement behavioural diagnosis in
individual patients—its validation procedures (e.g., permutation testing, correlations with
suspense, source localized activity), and findings in DOC patients remain unique.
Second, we further expanded the applicability of the naturalistic auditory assessment by
establishing a normative baseline of healthy control ISCs during a French version of
“Taken”. Few studies have investigated whether neural activity evoked by naturalistic
stimuli differs across languages. If, as we assume, much of the observed neural activity
(especially in frontal and parietal cortices) is driven by the semantic content of the audio
narrative rather than its physical/acoustic properties, then we would expect considerable
overlap between the two language versions. One such study by Honey et al. (2012) found
minimal differences in hemodynamic ISCs during the same audio story presented in
English to English-speaking participants and Russian to Russian-speaking participants.
Honey and colleagues suggested that, despite the structural differences between the two
languages, the shared meaning of the story produced spatially similar ISCs across groups.
Building off this work, with a focus on Canadian cohorts of chronic and acute DOC
patients, the study presented in Chapter 3 provided a direct comparison of EEG ISCs
between English and French versions of “Taken”. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the only study of its kind to do so.
Third, in Chapter 4, we demonstrated that the EEG “Taken” task may be clinically
informative for patients with severe acute brain injury, particularly when using a multimethod analysis technique. Neuroimaging research on acute DOC has rapidly accelerated
in recent years, with many studies investigating the efficacy of established neural
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assessments in the early stages of severe brain injury. These include covert command
following, hierarchical measures of perceptual function, and naturalistic processing tasks
that use music or speech (Chatelle et al., 2020; Edlow et al., 2017; Edlow & Naccache,
2021; Sokoliuk et al., 2021). Identifying neural correlates of conscious awareness in the
early stages of acute brain injury is critical for accurate diagnosis—especially when
behavioural markers are absent or unreliable. However, prognostication of outcome plays
a key role in guiding the course of treatment and determining whether to withdraw lifesustaining therapy (WLST). To the latter, naturalistic assessments of patients with acute
DOC improve prognostic accuracy relative to behavioural measures alone (Chatelle et al.,
2020; Sokoliuk et al., 2021; Threlkeld et al., 2018).
Relative to other methods, our ISCs analysis has the advantage of directly comparing an
individual patient’s neural activity during “Taken” to healthy controls while also
accounting for the variability in their EEG using permutation statistics. This technique
capitalizes on the known spatiotemporal extent of frontoparietal network activity during
“Taken” (Chapter 2) but allows us to flexibly accommodate individual differences in
EEG activity, which is ideal for patients with severe brain injury (Bareham et al., 2019;
Cruse et al., 2011; Engemann et al., 2018). Moreover, by presenting both the intact and
scrambled versions of the audio, we can differentiate ISCs related to auditory (scrambled)
and executive (intact) processing—thereby increasing the specificity of the assessment by
hierarchically indexing neural functions.
Finally, our multi-method analysis protocol, combined with contrasts between levels of
sedation, is unique in the acute DOC population. Previous studies have primarily focused
on a single neural measure (e.g., BOLD activation) or state of awareness (e.g., patients
off sedation). Our approach, however, enables multiple levels of analysis and captures
different dimensions of neural activity during the task; ISCs reflect the similarity of
neural activity between patients and controls; inter-electrode coherence quantifies the
contributions of different EEG frequency bands during the audio; cortical source
reconstruction uncovers the neural generators of EEG activity. The manipulation of level
of sedation also provided additional contrasts with which to compare across patients and
groups—namely, examining the magnitude of change within each analysis type (Duclos
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et al., 2020, 2021). While potentially meaningful on their own, each measure and contrast
can inform the others to create a detailed description of neural function among patients.
For example, while off sedation, patients with poor outcomes showed higher variability
in connectivity among Beta and Gamma frequency bands during the task. This may have
affected ISCs among patients who did not survive, as increased variability can heighten
thresholds for statistical significance when using permutation testing (Nichols & Holmes,
2002). While it was beyond the scope of this study to fully explore these relationships or
their prognostic value, it provides a novel model for EEG assessments of naturalistic
processing in patients with acute DOC.

4.7 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
4.7.1

Practical Concerns and Theoretical Issues

One of the most significant limitations of this thesis pertains to the sample size of acutely
comatose patients in Chapter 4. This study commenced weeks before the beginning
COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent restrictions, significantly affecting patient
enrollment. Nevertheless, we did manage to establish the feasibility of applying the
“Taken” paradigm in patients with severe acute brain injury, but our findings, particularly
those at the group level, should be interpreted with caution. Our ISCs analysis is designed
to assess individual DOC patients and, as such, was not necessarily affected by the small
sample size. However, any interpretation of significant ISCs relative to outcomes is
severely limited.
The same is true for the results from our functional connectivity and source localization
analyses as well. While there is evidence of disrupted EEG activity in patients with acute
DOC (Chatelle et al., 2020; Lehembre et al., 2012; O’Donnell et al., 2021), we found
only marginal differences in high-frequency variability between audio conditions when
comparing patients with good and poor outcomes. Given the novelty of this particular
contrast and the small sample size, it is difficult to reconcile this effect with those in the
broader literature. Still, the implications of these results—that is, patients with good
outcomes showed functional connectivity profiles that more closely resembled healthy
controls—are consistent with the hypotheses guiding our ISCs analysis and many neural
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assessments of DOC patients. Likewise, the prognostic efficacy of our source
localization procedure remains unclear. However, the differential activation of
frontoparietal and temporal regions during the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken”
does support the use of this assessment in acutely brain-injured patients.
Concerning patient outcomes, there is a crucial difference between natural death and
WLST. In Chapter 4, we coded outcomes as a binary variable to group patients who
survived from those who did not. This conflates natural physiological processes and
medical decision-making. WLST can be initiated for multiple reasons other than
imminent death; high probability of significant cognitive impairments, protracted length
of recovery, or personal beliefs surrounding medical interventions can play a significant
role in the decision to WLST (Barnato et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2020). Furthermore, natural
death in hospital may occur for reasons other than a patient’s primary injury. For
example, Patient 2 in Chapter 4 passed away from complications of pneumonia unrelated
to her initial cause of admission. For our purposes, however, separating patients with
poor outcomes by cause of death would have further reduced the sample size of this
group and, subsequently, the (already limited) statistical power of our analyses.
In a similar vein, the low statistical power of the study in Chapter 4 limited comparisons
between our EEG analyses and relevant clinical measures. Indeed, we obtained Glasgow
Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1976) scores for each of the five patients
included in this study, both while on and off pharmacological sedation. However, the
restricted range and number of GCS scores available from this sample hindered our
ability to discern meaningful relationships between behavioural scores and EEG. We also
planned to obtain Glasgow Outcome Scale-Extended (Teasdale et al., 1998) scores for
those who recovered, but patient follow-ups were also affected by the COVID-19
pandemic. These comparisons are crucial to establish the utility of neural assessments in
acutely comatose patients and are the only way to determine their prognostic efficacy in
this population. Future work, therefore, should prioritize evaluating the correspondence
(or lack thereof) between neural assessments and clinical behavioural measures of
awareness and eventual outcome after severe acute brain injury.
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4.7.2

Methodological Considerations

In general, naturalistic assessments of cognitive function in patients with DOC assuage
many of the constraints of active tasks and conventional passive paradigms (Naci et al.,
2014, 2015, 2018). However, the specific methodology outlined in this thesis has notable
limitations. Assessments of awareness in patients with DOC, whether behavioural or
neural, benefit from repeat applications; patients’ arousal and cognitive abilities fluctuate
over time, and accurate appraisals of their true level of function may require multiple
assessments. Naturalistic movie tasks, especially those that rely on narrative properties
like suspense, lose their ability to engage viewers/listeners and sustain their attention
upon repeat presentations. Dmochowski et al. (2012) found that ISCs among healthy
participants decreased considerably during a second viewing of “Bang! You’re Dead”,
owing to increased predictability of its events. Likewise, Ki and colleagues (2016)
reported a significant decrease in ISCs when participants attended to a secondary task.
Therefore, our EEG assessment is not ideal for routine assessments. Future work in this
area would benefit from including multiple movies and stories—each with their own
normative ISCs from healthy controls—to capture executive processing in individual
patients over time.
Another limitation of this approach relates to the number of EEG components available
for analysis relative to the one we used for assessment. The correlated components
analysis (CorrCA) extracts N – 1 (where N is the number of EEG sensors) topographic
components that reflect different patterns of EEG activity and underlying neural
processes (Dmochowski et al., 2012; Ki et al., 2016). Across the three studies presented
in this thesis, we only examined the component that maximized the correlation between
participants (i.e., the top-ranked component). Although we found strong evidence that the
top-ranked components in each movie condition captured task-relevant neural processes
(e.g., frontoparietal executive function during “Taken”; source localization in Chapter 2),
these are likely distributed across multiple components. As such, analyzing the time
courses and potential cortical sources of multiple CorrCA components, whether
individually or combined, could improve our ability to detect neural markers of executive
processing in patients with DOC.

147

Similarly, the way we implemented the CorrCA across these studies may not be
sufficiently sensitive to the complex dynamics of electrophysiological activity during
movie tasks. As noted in Chapter 4, CorrCA only accounts for fluctuations in EEG
amplitude over time; it does not index more complex signal dynamics like frequency or
phase. This was advantageous for a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of this
approach, as presented here, but does collapse across dimensions of thr EEG data which
undoubtedly capture meaningful aspects of narrative processing. Fluctuations in EEG
frequency power throughout the movies would most likely correspond with dynamic
changes in the physical features of the stimuli like brightness, motion, or loudness, as
well as higher-order properties like speech and, of course, the narrative. By these tracking
frequency dynamics—either by calculating the CorrCA within specific frequency
domains or employing a time-resolved version of inter-electrode coherence— we may be
able to simultaneously assess multiple levels of perceptual and cognitive function in
patients using a single stimulus.
Regarding functional connectivity, the approach described in Chapter 4 could also be
improved to more accurately describe the neural dynamics of acutely comatose patients
during the “Taken” task. Inter-electrode coherence is a relatively simplistic measure of
functional connectivity. Mathematically, coherence closely resembles cross-correlations
but is calculated on the frequency rather than the time domain. In this way, it is less
resistant to the codependences intrinsic in EEG data and to instantaneous (and likely
spurious) interactions between disparate areas. More sophisticated connectivity measures
like weight phase lag index and the imaginary part of the coherence method are more
robust to these effects and account for volume conduction (i.e., accounting for distance
between electrodes; Bastos & Schoffelen, 2016; Bowyer, 2016).
Similarly, there are many different methods to source localize EEG signals; minimum nor
estimates, low-resolution electromagnetic tomography, dipole modelling each have their
own advantages and limitations (Tadel et al., 2011). Irrespective of the specific method
used, the accuracy of cortical estimates generally improves when using second-order
analyses (Asadzadeh et al., 2020; Michel & Murray, 2012; Tadel et al., 2011).
Specifically, source estimation procedures of pre-processed EEG data provide a coarse
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estimate of its cortical generators and typically include some combination of noise and
spurious solutions across vertices. Applying additional analyses, like functional
connectivity, can ameliorate some of these concerns for the reasons outlined above.
Future work would benefit from moving beyond simple source estimation procedures
presented in Chapters 2 and 4 and, instead, include second-order analyses to improve the
precision of the solutions in healthy controls and patients with DOC.

4.8 Concluding Statements
Functional neuroimaging has revolutionized the assessment, diagnosis, and prognosis of
patients with chronic and acute DOC. Neural assessments are now recommended to
supplement standardized behavioural measures in cases where awareness cannot be
established after severe brain injury (Giacino et al., 2018). However, these assessments
vary considerably by type (e.g., fMRI, EEG) and objective. Naturalistic paradigms, like
the ones developed by Naci et al. (2014, 2015), are unique in their ability to characterize
the conscious experience of individual patients, in addition to perceptual function and
awareness. The EEG-based movie protocol presented in this thesis capitalizes on the
robust effects of naturalistic processing while also making this assessment technique
more accessible to researchers, clinicians, and patients alike. It is our hope that this
assessment, or updated versions of it, will be deployed widely across critical care and
outpatient centers as an alternative to previously established paradigms. While novel
technologies are being developed to establish functional communication in behaviourally
non-responsive patients (Abdalmalak et al., 2017; Chatelle et al., 2012) and therapeutic
interventions may one day cure DOC altogether (Cain et al., 2021; Monti et al., 2016), in
the interim, our EEG protocol provides a rapid, low-cost, and effective tool to detect
neural markers of preserved awareness in patients with chronic and acute DOC.
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Supplementary Information

Supplementary Figure 1. Factorial ANOVA results for the cross-projection analysis.
We performed a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to investigate potential interaction effects of our
cross-projection analysis, where we computed inter-subject correlations (ISCs) for the
data in one condition using the components from the other (e.g., computing ISCs for the
scrambled audio using the intact audio component). A) The 2x2 factorial ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of projection type, F(1,12) = 20.83, p = 7e-4, but no
interaction, F(1,12) = 0.73, p = 0.41, for the intact or scrambled versions of “Bang!
You’re Dead”. B) Similarly, only the main effect of projection type, F(1,14) = 73.12, p =
6.3e-7, was significant during the intact and scrambled version of “Taken”.

161

Supplementary Figure 2. Correlations between temporal ISCs and suspense ratings for
the intact and scrambled versions of “Bang! You’re Dead”. A) The time course of
temporal ISCs (red) for the intact version of “Bang! You’re Dead” were significantly
correlated to the suspense ratings for the movie (blue), r = 0.179, p = 6e-3. B) We did
not find a significant correlation between the temporal ISCs (red) and the intact suspense
ratings (blue) for the scrambled version of “Bang! You’re Dead”, r = 0.045, p = 0.486.
Note: Suspense ratings were scaled down to improve visualization, but correlations were
computed on unscaled values.
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Supplementary Figure 3. CorrCA component topographies from healthy controls
during the intact and scrambled versions of “Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken”. The
component topography calculated on the EEG data from the intact version of “Bang!
You’re Dead” (left, top) showed a considerable degree of similarity with the scrambled
component (right, top). However, the component from the intact version of “Taken” (left,
bottom) was highly dissimilar to the scrambled component (right, bottom).
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Supplementary Figure 4. Correlations between temporal ISCs and suspense ratings for
the intact and scrambled versions of “Taken”. A) The time course of temporal ISCs (red)
for the intact version of “Taken were significantly correlated to the suspense ratings for
the movie (blue), r = 0.186, p = 0.025. B) Like “Bang! You’re Dead”, the correlation
between the temporal ISCs (red) for the scrambled version of “Taken” and its intact
suspense ratings (blue) were not statistically significant, r = 0.107, p = 0.20.
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Supplementary Figure 5. Raw ISCs between patients and healthy controls for the intact
version of “Bang! You’re Dead” and “Taken”. A) Raw ISCs between patients (not
significant, purple; significant, red) and healthy controls for “Bang! You’re Dead”. B)
Raw ISCs between patients (not significant, purple; significant, red) and healthy controls
for “Taken”. Absolute ISCs were reported in the manuscript to account for individual
differences in dipole orientation (polarity) relative to the group-level component
projection.
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